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ABSTRACT  
This study set out to interrogate the impact of the U.S. - S.A. trade relationship 
on Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS). A qualitative method of 
study was chosen and the literature review method was used.  
South Africa’s foreign policy making was analysed and it was found that in 
1994, the country, sought international standing and economic growth. As such, 
it chose foreign policy that met the stringent criteria of Brenton Woods 
institutions and liberalised markets, privatised and had a stringent tax regime. 
The country also carved out a niche as an agent for peace on the African 
continent and a champion of the global South. 
South Africa’s post-democratic relationship with the United States was analysed 
and found to have been negatively impacted by the hangover of Cold War 
politics and the U.S.’s relationship with the apartheid government. The new 
government also considered Russia and other American enemies like Cuba, 
Iran and Lybia allies. The South African government never fully trusted the 
U.S.’s intentions and was wary of agreeing too often with the country for fear of 
being called a puppet of the U.S. However, the two countries managed to find 
common ground and continue to trade with each other successfully.  
The relationship between BLNS and S.A. in SACU was found to be unequal 
with BLNS still economically and geographically dependent on S.A. This is in 
spite numerous changes meant to bring about equality in SACU.  The study 
concluded that there was no real impact on BLNS as a result of the relationship 
between U.S. and S.A.BLNS suffered a negative impact when the European 
Union and S.A. signed an agreement but they ensured they were not victims of 
the U.S. – S.A. trade relationship. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Purpose  
The purpose of this section is to give a historic context to SA and its relations 
with the US and BLNS. This chapter introduces the reader to South Africa and 
its relationship with Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS). It 
deals with the history between the two countries as neighbours that are bound 
by their agreement under the South African Customs Union (SACU). It also 
provides a context for how SA and the US became trade partners in the first 
place. The chapter then introduces the reader to how South Africa’s foreign 
policy strategy came to being, which will contribute towards achieving a greater 
understanding of why South Africa made and continues to make the decisions 
that it does. 
The topic of this thesis is ‘The impact of the United States (US.) and South 
Africa’s (S.A) trade relationship on Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland 
(BLNS) [1999-2013]’. The principal research question is how BLNS was 
impacted by the trade relationship between the US and SA in the period 1999 -
2013. 
Many researchers study regional integration agreements and their impact. 
However, such studies are usually based on the assumption that the schemes 
are good for all participating economies. This study will set out to find if there 
was any impact, negative or positive on smaller countries like BLNS from the 
relationship that their biggest partner (SA) has with its trade partner (US). The 
study is therefore concerned with the interaction between multiple agreements 
amongst different trade partners, namely, the US, SA and BLNS. 
In order to fully explore this question various agreements have been placed 
under the spotlight namely: 
 The African Growth and Opportunities Act of 2000 (AGOA) 
 The SA – US. Trade Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) 
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 SACU agreements between members of 1910, 1969 and 2002 
 The failed SACU –US Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that became the 
SACU – US. Trade, Investment, and Development Cooperation 
Agreement (TIDCA) 
Other issues that will be interrogated are:   
 South Africa’s foreign policy in the post-apartheid era 
 South Africa’s relationship with the United States 
 South Africa’s role in the Southern African Customs Union 
 South Africa’s role on the continent and the world economy 
The issues above will be understood by asking the following research 
questions:  
1. What was the historical context of the US – SA relationship and how did 
that context affect the foreign policy objectives when relating and signing 
agreements with the US? 
2. What is the historical context of the relationship between SA and BLNS 
and how did that affect the foreign policy objectives when relating and 
signing agreements with the SACU? 
3. What impact did domestic politics and national interest have on South 
Africa’s foreign policy actions in the relationships outlined above?  
4. Was there any impact on BLNS arising from the relationship between SA 
– US? 
1.2 Historical background 
“International trade is the transmission belt that links global production and 
consumption. This implies that trade is principally driven by the supply potential 
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of countries, the demand for traded goods and services as well as geographical 
and policy-driven “frictions”, which determine the transmission belt's efficiency.1” 
In order to fully understand what the motivation for the relationship between SA 
and the US, it is important to understand the context in which SA entered the 
global market. In global terms, South Africa is a small economy with only 0.5% 
share of the global economy, but it is the most diverse economy in Africa2. As a 
result of this, and its size it holds a special place internationally and on the 
continent. 
1.2.1 South Africa and the United States of America  
South Africa’s relationship with the US has withstood trying times, from a 
healthy relationship with the apartheid government to economic sanctions, back 
to a healthy relationship with the post-apartheid government.  
South Africa was initially a British colony but gained independence from Britain 
in 19103. The country was segregated, with the different racial groups having an 
unequal status but it was only with the introduction of the system of apartheid 
that racial discrimination was legislated. The system of apartheid began formally 
in 1948 when the National Party won the general election –in which only whites 
were allowed to participate4. This marked the beginning of legislated 
discrimination5. Ever since the system began, there was mild opposition against 
it and some noise in the international community but it was the Sharpeville 
massacre of 1960 that brought attention to the violent nature of the system 
towards black South Africans6.  
 
                                            
1 World Trade Report. (2013). Accessed from http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr13_forum_e.htm on 05 
June 2013 
2 Goldman Sacks. (4 November 2013).Two decades of freedom. What South Africa is doing with it and what needs to 
be done. Pp4 Accessed from http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/focus-on/growth-markets/colin-coleman/20-
yrs-of-freedom.pdf on 6 June 2013 
3 World and African history: Africa, Colonialism, arts, protest, independence. Accessed from  
http://www.sahistory.org.za/world-and-african-history/africa-colonialism-arts-protest-independence on 15 March 2014 
4 Apartheid and limits non-violent resistance 1948-1960. Accessed from http://www.sahistory.org.za/liberation-struggle-
south-africa/apartheid-and-limits-non-violent-resistance-1948-1960 Accessed on 6 June 2013 
5 Ibid  
6 Ibid 
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In its aftermath, the United Nations called for sanctions against the South 
African government7.  This became a failed bid as Security Council members, 
Britain, France and the United States, successfully watered down the UN’s 
proposals8. The United States did not stop at watering down the UN’s proposal 
in its support for South Africa. Coleman- Adebayo 9 and other critics of the 
relationship between the US and South Africa accuse the US of being a “faithful 
ally of the racist apartheid regime10”. As evidence of the extent of the support 
Coleman-Adebayo recounts revelations that it was the US’s Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), working with an ANC agent that revealed the whereabouts of 
ANC leader, Nelson Mandela, to the South African government that led to 
Mandela’s arrest in 196211 .  
Furthermore, US president, Ronald Reagan also called Mandela a terrorist and 
pursued a highly controversial “‘constructive engagement’ (i.e., dialogue) with 
the white South African regime, regarding this approach as the most effective 
way to promote change12”, a policy which to this day still meets criticism. 
Following the UN proposal, various lobby groups in the US and Europe put 
pressure on their governments to impose sanctions on South Africa. Resistance 
against apartheid externally and internally, continued from the Sharpeville 
massacre of the sixties and was at its loudest by the 1976 Soweto Uprising. The 
eighties era of resistance saw protests across the county coupled with threats of 
international sanctions and led to the institution of a state of emergency by the 
apartheid government in 198613. Anti-apartheid protest group’s efforts finally 
paid off when the US Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act 
in 198614. As a direct result of this act many international companies left South 
                                            
7 Sharpville Massacre and its Historic Significance. Accessed from http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/sharpeville-
massacre-its-historic-significance-struggle-against-apartheid on 12 June 2013 
8 Ibid  
9 Coleman-Adebayo M. (14 December 2013). Eyewitness to America Betraying Mandela's South Africa: The Gore-
Mbeki Commission. Truthout. Op-Ed Section. Accessed from    http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/20597-eyewitness-
to-america-betraying-mandelas-south-africa-the-gore-mbeki-commission on 16 March 2014 
10 Ibid   
11 Ibid  
12 Ploch L. (4 January 2011). South Africa: Current Issues and U.S.  Relations. Congressional Research Service. pp 18 
Accessed from https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31697.pdf on April  2013 
13 Lulat Y. G-M. (2008).U.S. African Americans and South Africa, 1949 -2008. In United States Relations with South 
Africa. A Critical Overview from the Colonial Period to the Present.  
14 Stephen Kaufman.(16 December 2013). Pressure to End Apartheid Began at Grass Roots in U.S. Accessed from  
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2013/12/20131216288978.html?CP.rss=true#ixzz38PcPQnPH on 12 
January 2014 
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Africa and the South African economy struggled with the effects of internal and 
external boycotts15 as shown in the graph below. 
Table 1: South Africa: average annual growth Source: Edwards and Edwards 16  
Years Export Volume Import Volume GDP 
1960-1970  
1971-1980  
1981-1990  
1991-2000  
2001-2004   
4.5  
0.9  
1.4  
5.3  
1.1  
7.8 
1.9 
0.3 
6 
6.6 
5.7 
3.4 
1.5 
1.9 
3.2 
As shown above, during the eighties, 
“trade protection seriously impeded both exports and imports, and the 
economy depended on favourable global commodity price trends to 
avoid running into an external constraint… the pattern of protection was 
particularly detrimental to exports of non-commodity manufactured 
goods..17”  
In spite of the history outlined above, South Africa and the US were bound to be 
trade partners. According to Stremlau18, the countries “are bound by the 
proposition that all people are created equal19” and their shared history of 
moving from a legislated racism to a non-racist society.  
South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy was a long and difficult 
process. It therefore comes as no surprise that, at the dawn of democracy in 
1994, South Africa, had to develop new trade relations with both old and new 
trade partners. It was important for old trade partners in particular, to be aware 
                                            
15 Disinvestment moves by two major companies. Accessed from http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-
event/disinvestment-moves-two-major-companies. Accessed on 12 January 2014 
16 Edwards L, Edwards R. (December 2006). South African Trade Policy Matters: Trade Performance and Trade Policy. 
Working Paper 12760. National Burea of Economic Research. Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12760. Pp 5 
17 Ibid 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12760. Abstract 
18 Mills G. and Stremlau J. (2000).The Reality behind the rhetoric: the United States, South Africa and Africa. South 
African Institute of International Affairs and The Centre for Strategic and International Studies.pp vii 
19 Ibid 
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that, they were negotiating with a new country, with new goals, which were 
different from the apartheid regime.  
1.3 South Africa and its BLNS neighbours 
1.3.1 Historical Context 
South Africa has a long relationship with BLNS countries that pre-dates even 
apartheid. There have been formal economic ties between the countries since 
the establishment of SACU in 1910. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, were 
colonies of the United Kingdom at the time. In the 1960s Botswana, Lesotho 
and Swaziland gained their freedom and became independent states, which led 
to the first SACU re-negotiation of terms in 1969.  
Another negotiation of terms took place in the period between 1994 and 2002. 
This followed Namibia joining SACU in 1990 and the independence of South 
Africa in 199420. All these changes also took place as the global economy was 
changing. Most notably, there was pressure on developing countries to 
liberalize their economies in the 1980s and the fall of the Berlin Wall which also 
signalled the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the expansion of the 
capitalist system under globalisation. 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland are dependent on South Africa’s 
economy for SACU revenues as well as the provision of employment for its 
citizens21. South Africa on the other hand, has and continues to depend on 
these countries’ citizens for labour and has done so since the early days of its 
mining industry. For many years, South Africa has and to a certain extent 
continues to provide infrastructure like the telecoms, power and railroads for 
BLNS22. South Africa has an advanced system of road, railroad and ports, 
which meant goods could be transported from their countries of origin through 
                                            
20 Grynberg R., Motswapong M. (24 April 2012). SACU Revenue Sharing Formula: Towards a Developmental 
Agreement. BIDPA Working Paper 
21 Hentz J.J. (2005). Conclusion: Post Apartheid South Africa’s Regional Relations. In South Africa and the logic of 
regional co-operation. Pp 165 
22 Ibid 
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South Africa into BLNS23. These countries are also geographically dependent 
on South Africa because of their close proximity to the country; with Lesotho24 
the most vulnerable as it is completely surrounded by South Africa.  
1.3.2 Botswana and South Africa  
During apartheid, relations between South Africa and Botswana were strained 
although both were part of SACU. Botswana publicly declared its stand in 
opposition to apartheid and even provided a safe-haven to members of banned 
political organisations like the ANC.  However, there was still a lot of trade 
happening between the countries under SACU25. 
Botswana’s geographic and economic dependence on South Africa meant that, 
it could not impose economic sanctions on the country. It is only in the post- 
apartheid era that relations became good again between the two countries.  
1.3.3 Lesotho and South Africa 
Relations between South Africa and Lesotho were also tense during the 
apartheid era. Out of all its neighbours, Lesotho relied on South Africa the most 
because of its landlocked status. This meant that all goods going into and 
coming out of Lesotho had to go via South Africa. This left Lesotho both 
economically and geographically dependent on South Africa. Until the 1960’s, 
South Africa attempted various times to argue for the incorporation of the 
country without much success26. 
In spite of their dependence, Lesotho criticised the South African government 
for their apartheid policy. It also provided a safe haven for members of banned 
political parties like the ANC, PAC and many others. In 1966, Lesotho gained 
                                            
23 Relations with African States. Accessed from  http://countrystudies.us/south-africa/83.htm on 25 March 2014 
24 Khadija Patel. (19 April 2013).Lesotho and South Africa: ‘Good fences make good neighbours’. Daily Maverick. 
Accessed from http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2013-04-19-lesotho-and-south-africa-good-fences-make-good-
neighbours/#.UyRpVM4w1uM. 12 May 2013 
25 Botswana. Country Report. Accessed from http://countrystudies.us/south-africa/83.htm on 25 January 2014 
26 Lesotho. Country Studies. Accessed from http://countrystudies.us/south-africa/83.htm on 25 January 2014 
 
19
independence from colonialism and was ruled by a constitutional monarchy until 
201227. 
1.3.4 Namibia and South Africa 
Like the other BLNS countries, Namibia and South Africa have a long 
relationship. Namibia was a colony of Germany from the 1800’s until the early 
1900’s28. It became the territory of South Africa from 1919, when the League of 
Nations gave the country a mandate over Namibia until 1988. The country, 
formerly South-West Africa, also had apartheid laws introduced in 1964 
following their introduction in 1948 in South Africa29. The United Nations 
attempted to revoke South Africa’s mandate over Namibia, a number of times 
but only succeeded when South Africa handed over administrative control to the 
country in 1985 and then signed an agreement releasing Namibia in 1988. It 
was only in 1990, that the country gained its independence from whites only 
rule, which caused tension as the leaders of the new Namibian government, 
had led the war to oust South Africa30. 
1.3.5  Swaziland South Africa 
Swaziland is yet another neighbour that is economically and geographically 
dependent on South Africa. It has had co-operation agreements with South 
Africa on economic and security issues since the 1970s. Its role gained more 
importance during economic sanctions as “South African businesses also used 
Swazi territory as a transhipment point in order to circumvent international 
sanctions on South Africa31. “ 
Its status during the fight against apartheid was not always clear- cut. It 
provided a safe haven for members of the ANC and other banned political 
                                            
27 Southern African – German Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Country Profile: Lesotho Accessed from  
http://suedafrika.ahk.de/en/country-profile/lesotho/ on 20 January 2014 
28 Namibia. South Africa History. Accessed from http://www.sahistory.org.za/places/namibia on 28 May 2014 
29 Ibid  
30 Ibid 
31 Swaziland. Country Data. Accessed from http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-12184.html on 20 January 
2014. 
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parties but also allowed South African security forces to carry out some 
operations in the country32. 
As outlined above, during apartheid, South Africa’s neighbours openly criticised 
the government’s policy of segregation and even harboured operatives of the 
ANC and other banned political parties in their countries. As the political 
situation in South Africa changed, so did South Africa’s relationship with its 
neighbours. In fact, the opposition to apartheid became a unifying force 
amongst countries on the African continent, especially BLNS countries, which 
were economically and geographically dependent on South Africa and therefore 
could not completely divorce themselves from the country and its trade. 
After economic sanctions against SA were implemented, trade with BLNS 
became even more crucial for SA as the countries could not impose sanctions 
on SA. As outlined earlier, countries like Swaziland became strategically 
important for circumventing the sanctions.  
At the dawn of democracy in 1994, South Africa’s first democratic President and 
the president of the ruling ANC, Nelson Mandela, made it clear that the country 
wanted a good relationship with the continent and particularly South Africa’s 
neighbours33. The country was moving from having an imperialist top down 
approach towards its neighbours to a relationship that sought partnerships and 
wanted to recognise the importance of each player34. This was in spite of South 
Africa’s continued economic power and the neighbours continued dependency 
as explained above.  
1.3.6 BLNS and the US 
All SACU members trade with the United States; however, there is a vast 
difference between their trade volumes and therefore the bilateral relations with 
the US. South Africa’s economic status is not comparable to those of  its trading 
                                            
32 Swaziland. Country Data. Accessed from http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-12184.html on 20 January 
2014. 
33 Field S. (12 November 2000). From Polecat to Leader of the South: A review of South Africa’s Foreign Policy since 
1994. Prepared for the Presidency: Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Services. Institute for Global Dialogue. 
34 Ibid  
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partners. The differences in economic status are recognised by institutions like 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO). “Botswana and South Africa are 
classified as upper middle income countries while Namibia and Swaziland are 
considered low-middle income countries and Lesotho is a least-developed 
country35”. The graph show the below shows just how big the gaps between 
SACU members trade with the US are. 
 
Figure 1: Comparison of USA trade: SA vs BLNS Source: United States Trade Representative Data 2012 36 
For the US, SACU is the biggest trade partner outside of oil producing Nigeria. 
Within SACU, the US’s biggest trade partner is South Africa, as shown in the 
table below37. 
 
 
Table 2: Trade between SA and the USA Source: Department of Trade and Industry (SA) trade data38 
                                            
35 World Trade Organisation. (30 September 2009). Trade Policy Review Body Report by the Secretariat: South African 
Customs Union. p 1 
36 Accessed from http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa/southern-africa . Accessed on 26 February 2013 
37  Phiri D. (October 2009). The SACU- US TIDCA: South African Private Sector Perspectives. 
38  Ibid 
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The graph and the table show that the trade relationship between the U.S. and 
South Africa is important for both countries. It also shows just how little the U.S. 
and BLNS benefit from having a relationship with each other, especially when 
compared to South Africa. 
1.4 The making of South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign 
policy 
At the dawn of democracy, South Africa found itself at a crossroads, having to 
decide which inter-state relationships from the apartheid era to continue with or 
discontinue. A new approach was required for both old and new trade 
relationships. Architects of the transition knew that the new South Africa would 
require a large influx of capital but they could not agree on which foreign policy 
strategy to follow39. 
Three competing approaches to trade were discussed during the transition 
period and each had its own supporters and detractors. The approaches were, 
the ‘developmental co-operation approach’, ‘the market co-operation/ laissez-
faire approach’ and the ‘ad hoc cooperation approach40’.  
Hentz describes the developmental co-operation approach as “co-operation that 
would facilitate economic development for all of South Africa’s economy” 41. 
This approach was initially supported by one of the main players of the 
negotiations and the future ruling party, the ANC and its allies, labour groups 
such as Congress of Southern African Trade Unions (COSATU) as well as Die 
Afrikaans Handelsinstituut. Initially, the ANC seemed to fall towards a 
                                            
39 Hentz J.J. (2005). Conclusion: Post-Apartheid South Africa’s Regional Relations. In South Africa and the logic of 
regional co-operation. Pp 163 -184 
40 Ibid   
41 Ibid pp 164  
South Africa Trade by Country 
Country Annual growth %
Name 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2013 2012 Total % Cum % 2012-2013
UNITED STATES EXPORT 67 017 64 417 59 701 52 658 41 554 2 2 77.34 77.34 4.04
UNITED STATES IMPORT 62913.552 60966.903 57292.302 42887.053 42159.29 4 4 61.722552 61.722552 3.192961353
TOTAL TRADE BALANCE 129 931 125 384 116 994 95 545 83 713
Exports to and Import from  in ( R' Million) Rank Proportions 2013
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“Keynesian based socialist policy” 42 which “implied state managed 
cooperation…supporting a strong state role for promoting economic 
development43” but later, the organisation’s stance changed. 
The second approach was the “market co-operation/laissez-faire approach44”, 
which falls under “neoliberal orthodoxy” and “promoted regional integration 
through the expansion of free trade”. This had supporters from external actors 
like the European Union, International Financial Institutions, IMF and World 
Bank and others. It was also the preferred policy choice of big business and 
officials from the old regime45.  
The third approach was the “ad hoc co-operation approach46”, also supported 
by “the old regime….big business and the parastatals.” This approach was 
favoured by those who were “benefiting from the dependence of neighbouring 
countries on South Africa’s regional telecommunications, electricity grid and 
railroads47” This approach included those who argued that if South Africa 
retained its dominant position then there would be no need for “institutionalised 
regionalism48”.  This approach would allow South Africa to retain dominance 
over the region and the industries where it already dominated49. 
As mentioned earlier, the ANC later changed their stance in terms of which 
ideology to follow. The supporters of the ad-hoc approach dominated the 
‘informal’ economic talks that ran parallel to the political talks at the Convention 
for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) 50. They managed to convince the 
ANC of the merits of this approach and as a result, the ANC began to talk more 
about neoliberal economics. 
                                            
42 Hentz J.J. (2005). Conclusion: Post Apartheid South Africa’s Regional Relations. In South Africa and the logic of 
regional co-operation. Pp 164 
43 Ibid pp 164 
44Ibid pp 164 
45 Ibid pp 165 
46 Ibid pp 165 
47 Ibid pp 165 
48 Ibid pp 166 
49Ibid pp 166 
50 Ibid pp 166 
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According to Terreblanche51 , at the beginning of the transition period, the ANC 
was “socialist oriented” whilst South African business was “capitalist oriented” 
but this changed over time”. He observed that, “the joint TEC – IMF statement 
shows clearly that the core ANC leaders must have changed their strategic and 
ideological thinking in important ways from 1992 onwards.52” He adds further 
that, by the end of the negotiation period, the ANC had committed itself to “a 
macro-economic and fiscal policy that clearly excluded a comprehensive 
redistribution policy for addressing the predicament of the poorest half of the 
population53.” This thinking was largely at odds with the people-centred 
economic policies that the ANC championed at the beginning of the 
negotiations. This ideological shift was clearly visible in post-apartheid foreign 
policy. Edwards et al 54 characterises it as different from apartheid era foreign 
policy and a move “from export promotion with import controls to greater 
openness through tariff libelirazation.” This decision to liberalise had a large 
impact on how South Africa interacted with its allies, neighbours and trade 
partners. 
  
                                            
51 Terreblanche, S. (2002). A history of Inequality in South Africa 1652 -2002. University of Natal Press. 
Pietermaritzburg.pp95 
52 Ibid pp 97 
53 Ibid pp 97 
54 Edwards L, Cassim R, Seventer D. (2009). Trade policy in South Africa. (Eds) Aron J, Kahn B and Kingdon G.   South 
African Economic Policy under Policy under Democracy. Oxford University Press. pp151 -178 
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1.5 Summary 
This chapter set out to introduce the study and provide a historical context for 
SA and its relations. To that end, the love-hate relationship between apartheid 
South Africa and BLNS countries was analysed. The argument that SACU was 
and continues to be a marriage of the unequal with South Africa dominating the 
policy direction of the union was introduced.  As outlined above, BLNS found 
itself bound to South Africa, even during international economic sanctions. 
SACU bound the countries together indefinitely and was highly beneficial to 
South Africa, especially in the sanctions era. However, the opposition of the 
system of apartheid became a powerful unifying force for BLNS countries, 
which were economically and geographically dependent on S.A.  
The history between apartheid South Africa and the U.S. was also discussed. 
Apartheid South Africa had a close relationship with United States, especially 
president Ronald Reagan, who engaged the country under a controversial 
policy. The U.S. even thwarted initial UN efforts to impose sanctions until the 
anti-apartheid lobby finally won in 1986. This historical background will be 
important in understanding the ambivalence of the new South African 
government when interacting with the U.S. which will be discussed in 
subsequent chapters. 
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CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH CONTEXT AND APPROACH 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the method and theoretical framework used to analyse 
data in the study. A thorough literature review is conducted to understand the 
scope of the study and distinguish between what research has been done and 
what research still needs to be done in the area of study. Studies that research 
the impact of the relationship between the U.S. and S.A. as well as the 
relationship between S.A. and BLNS are critically analysed and dissected. A 
hypothesis is presented as well as the problem statement and its sub-problems. 
The validity and reliability of the study is also undertaken and the limitations to 
the study are discussed. 
This study forms part of a larger volume of studies into the high volumes of 
trade agreements signed worldwide. In the past 50 years alone, there has been 
a proliferation of multiple Regional Integration Arrangements (RIA’s), Free 
Trade Agreements (FTA’s) and Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA’s) as 
indicated in the graph below.  
 
Figure 2: RTAs notified to the GATT/WTO (1948-2002), cumulative. Source: World Trade Organisation Annual 
Report: 2002 
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2.2 Significance of the study 
This is not the first regional integration study and not the first study into South 
Africa’s trade agreements. However, it is one of few studies that interrogates 
the impact of multiple agreements on individual members of regional integration 
schemes. In this case the study seeks to understand how the agreements 
signed by South Africa (a member of SACU), affected other members of SACU, 
namely BLNS. There have been studies on the impact of S.A.’s relationship with 
the E.U. on BLNS before but none that interrogates the impact of the U.S.-S.A. 
relationship on BLNS. 
This study is therefore important as it can help smaller countries in trade 
agreements with regional or global powerhouses weigh up the pros and cons of 
such agreements.  Smaller economies in regional schemes like (ECOWAS), 
where Nigeria dominates and East African Community (EAC) where Kenya 
dominates could benefit from this study. The experience of BLNS will also help 
these and other countries understand the power dynamics that are at play when 
regional and global powerhouses become trading partners. In future, smaller 
economies similar to BLNS can use this knowledge to negotiate better trade 
agreements in bilateral and regional trade agreements.  
An analysis of the U.S. – SA trade relationship’s impact on BLNS is also 
important because SACU remains one of the key trading partners of the U.S. 
and South Africa remains, the biggest trading partner to the U.S. in 
SACU55.This means that SACU and South Africa are important trade partners 
for the U.S.  
BLNS states under SACU make for an interesting study because of their long 
relationship and trade ties with South Africa. Even when they disagreed with 
South Africa’s policy of apartheid, the SACU agreement held because of their 
economic and geographic dependency on South Africa as outlined in the 
previous chapter. SACU itself is the oldest customs union in the world and this 
                                            
55  Phiri D. (22 October 2009). The SACU- US TIDCA: South African Private Sector Perspectives. Business Unity South 
Africa. 1st draft 
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makes it a good organisation to study as it is one of the few African regional 
integration schemes that is more than a hundred years old. Its age makes it the 
example of the most developed form of regional integration on the continent. Its 
counterparts are younger, and have not evolved as much as SACU. In the era 
of wholesale regional integration agreements and studies, this makes a study 
focusing on SACU important for understanding the regional integration process 
in developing countries. The majority of regional integration studies and theories 
are based on European experiences of integration and how the EU developed 
into what it is today.  
This study is also important because of the history of the relationship between 
S.A. and BLNS during negotiations with third parties. SACU has been 
previously proven to be a grouping of unequal members at many points in 
history. For example, in a study conducted by Van de Staak 56, he analysed the 
impact of South Africa’s trade agreement with the European Union on all BLNS 
countries. He found that BLNS countries suffered from the agreement, so much 
so that South Africa and the EU came up with financial compensation in the 
form of aid packages to offset the economic losses the countries faced as a 
result of their trade agreement and the opening of their markets to European 
Union products and companies57. Mc Donald and Walmsley 58 also analysed 
the effect of an E.U. –S.A. trade agreement on one BLNS country, Botswana, 
and found that there was an adverse effect that led to the U.S. having free 
access to Botswana but Botswana not enjoying that freedom in return.  
Mc Donald and Walmsley’s then concluded that: 
“…more and more PTAs will be formed between states that are signatories to 
other agreements, and where the preferences provided by a new agreement do 
not extend to other countries in existing agreements. How these multiple 
agreements interact is likely to become an important consideration in both the 
                                            
56 Van der Staak S.(2006). Trade liberalisation and financial compensation: the BLNS states in the wake of the EU-
South African trade and development agreement. African Studies Centre .Research Report 84. 
57 Ibid  
58 Mc Donald S and Walmsley T. (2003). Bilateral Free Trade Agreements and Customs Unions: 
The Impact of the EU Republic of South Africa Free Trade Agreement on Botswana. GTAP Working Paper No. 29 
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framing of PTAs and in efforts to ensure that PTAs do not have adverse 
unintended effects. In particular it may be deemed important to ensure that the 
least developed nations, who are small, vulnerable and disproportionately 
concentrated in Africa, are not adversely affected.59” 
This study is significant because it allows for an analysis of whether SACU 
learnt from the experience of S.A.’s trade agreement with the E.U. It is  
concerned with how the U.S. – S.A. ‘s trade relationship affects, BLNS, which 
includes some ‘least developed nations’ that are ‘small’ and ‘vulnerable’ like 
Lesotho60. It is a study that seeks to understand how ‘multiple agreements’ 
have an impact (intended or not) on countries that may or may not be 
signatories to an agreement as is the case with U.S. and S.A., a member of 
SACU. 
2.2.1 Problem statement 
Mistry argues that the spoils of regional integration schemes are not always 
equally to the benefit of all its participants.  
“Where regional integration arrangements (RIA) have succeeded in generating 
visible gains, their distribution has often been perceived as inequitable by the 
less developed members of the group” 61 
This is the crux of what this study aims to analyse: 
a. Research question: 
If South Africa’s relationship with the US was beneficial to South Africa was it 
equally beneficial for South Africa’s neighbours, BLNS?  
The problem statement may further be broken down as:  
                                            
59 Mc Donald S and Walmsley T. (2003). Bilateral Free Trade Agreements and Customs Unions: 
The Impact of the EU Republic of South Africa Free Trade Agreement on Botswana. GTAP Working Paper No. 29 
60 Ibid  
61Mistry, P.(1996). Regional Integration Arrangements in Economic Development, Panacea or Pitfall? The Hague: 
Forum on Debt and Development. pp 26 
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i. Sub-problem 1:  
Were the spoils of SACU perceived as inequitable or equitable to the ‘less 
developed members of the group’, i.e. BLNS?  
ii. Sub-problem 2:  
Did BLNS countries become affected in any way, (negative or positive) by the 
relationship between the US and South Africa? 
 
Alden and Le Pere62  analyse South Africa’s role in the continent and argue that 
the country presents many ambiguities and contradictions in its interactions with 
the continent which can lead to confusion about whether it’s a hegemon or 
partner. 
They summarise South Africa’s relationship with the continent as thus: 
“The normative foundations of its Africa engagement with regard to providing 
public goods and leadership in peace diplomacy, resolving conflicts, and 
helping to develop the continent’s institutions collides with the more 
instrumental aspects relating to investment, its commercial interests and the 
material sources of its hegemony.”63 
As part of providing a context for the study, ambiguities affecting the 
relationship between South Africa and BLNS states within the context of South 
Africa’s relationship with the US will also be analysed throughout this study. 
2.3 Research Approach/Design 
This study is qualitative and mainly draws on primary, documentary evidence. In 
this study, a content analysis of existing literature was undertaken in order to 
                                            
62 Alden C and le Pere G. (April 2009). South Africa in Africa – bound to lead? Politikon: South African Journal of 
Political Studies., 36,1. pp 145 – 169 
63 Ibid 
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conduct research that seeks to find out the impact of the U.S. and S.A. trade 
relationship on BLNS counties.  
This research is centred on economic and political agreements and treaties as 
well as statistical analysis, theories and concepts of regional integration, with a 
specific focus on SACU as a customs union.  The research is organised into 
data that is from primary and secondary sources.  Primary data consists of 
some unpublished works, including conference papers, speeches, and some 
published interviews with various stakeholders from US, SA and BLNS 
countries as well as media articles and sources from the internet. All of them 
offer original information on historic and current trends in regional integration 
and customs unions. They also tackle the workings of the global economic 
system and cooperation amongst nations. The information covers the African 
continent and the rest of the world.  
 In terms of internet sources, the SACU official website, the South African 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Department of International Relations 
and Co-operation (DIRCO) as well as those of the Office of the United States 
Trade Representative, US Congressional Service Reports and other relevant 
websites were central to the writing of this study. Data from the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the World Bank and IMF as well as international political 
economy journal articles and other existing studies were also used. Of equal 
importance has been information from a source who works at the Department of 
Trade and Industry who was able to separate the theory from the real workings 
of the agreements. 
A thorough literature review was undertaken to develop a sound theoretical 
framework for this specific topic and the sources mentioned here are the 
backbone of the study. They provide information on all aspects of the study 
from regional integration to bilateral and multilateral agreements between 
developing and developed countries as well as political and economic relations 
between countries. 
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2.4 Research Methodology  
This study is a qualitative research study, which is defined as research which 
“seeks to understand underlying motives of human behaviour64”. It is analytical 
in nature in that it “uses facts or information already available and analyse these 
to make a critical evaluation of the material65”. It is different to descriptive 
research “which includes surveys and fact-finding enquiries of different kinds66” 
The study also seeks to “identify social, economic or political trends that may 
affect a particular institution …67” The research is also conceptual in nature as  
it “relates to some abstract ideas or theory68”. 
In this case, we are researching to find out the impact of the U.S. and S.A. trade 
relationship on BLNS counties. Qualitative research methods have struggled for 
acceptance in the scientific research industry and they have been deemed as 
‘unscientific, or only exploratory, or subjective’69.  
According to Cassel and Symon 70 qualitative research is: 
"a focus on interpretation rather than quantification; an emphasis on subjectivity 
rather than objectivity; flexibility in the process of conducting research; an 
orientation towards process rather than outcome; a concern with context—
regarding behaviour and situation as inextricably linked in forming experience; 
and finally, an explicit recognition of the impact of the research process on the 
research situation" 
The quantitative method of research has not been used because of known 
criticisms which are that sometimes:  
                                            
64 Kumar R. (2008). Research Methodology: An Introduction in Research Methodology Accessed from 
http://www.newagepublishers.com/samplechapter/000896.pdf on 14 November 2014 pp 2-4 
65 Ibid  
66 Ibid  
67Ibid  
68 Ibid  
69 Denzin, Norman K., & Lincoln, Yvonna S. (2000). Introduction: The discipline and practice of qualitative research. In 
Norman K. Denzin & Yvonne S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research (2nd ed., pp.7). Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
70 Cassell, Catherine, & Symon, Gillian (1994). Qualitative research in work contexts. In Cassell C & Symon G (Eds.), 
Qualitative methods in organizational research, a practical guide (pp 7). London: Sage. 
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“samples are small and not necessarily representative of the broader 
population, so it is difficult to know  how far we can generalise the results;  the 
findings lack rigour; it is difficult to tell how far the findings  are biased by the 
researcher’s own opinions”.  
 
This does not mean that qualitative methods of research are without criticism. 
Qualitative methods of study have been criticised for not always being able to 
prove validity and reliability. Another criticism is that qualitative research 
methodology requires you to extract the relevant parts of the text first and then 
analyse those parts.  
The graph below sets out to further explain the differences between qualitative 
and quantitative research methods in an attempt to explain why the latter was 
chosen. 
Table 3: Differences between qualitative and quantitative research methods Source: Rajasekar et al71 
Qualitative  Quantitative 
Non-numerical, descriptive, applies reasoning and uses 
words 
Numerical, non-descriptive, applies statistics or 
mathematics and uses numbers. 
Aim is to get the meaning, feeling and describe the 
situation 
An iterative process whereby evidence is evaluated 
Qualitative data cannot be graphed Results are often presented in tables and graphs 
Exploratory Conclusive 
Investigates the why and how of decision making Investigates the what, where and when of decision making 
2.5 Literature Review Method 
A literature review is more than just a collection of papers and articles on the 
topic of study. Hart 72defines it as “the use of ideas in the literature to justify the 
particular approach to the topic, the selection of methods, and demonstration 
that this research contributes something new73.”  Webster and Watson 74 argue 
                                            
71 S. Rajasekar S, Philominathan P, Chinnathambi V. (14 Oct 2013). Research Methodology. Accessed from 
http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0601009v3     on  15 November 2013 
72 Hart C. (1998). Doing a literature review: Releasing the social science research imagination. London,  
UK: Sage Publications. pp1 
73 Ibid  
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further that an effective review of literature “creates a firm foundation for 
advancing knowledge”. They add further that it “facilitates theory development, 
closes areas where a plethora of research exists, and uncovers areas where 
research is needed75”. This literature review aims to provide the explanations 
discussed by Hart 76and Webster and Watson77. 
2.6 Validity and Reliability 
The validity and reliability of the qualitative method has been criticized for 
posing problems of inference and problems of reliability. Titscher et al 78defines 
the two as:  
a. “Problems of inference relate to the possibility of drawing conclusions, on 
the one hand, about the whole text on the basis of the text sample and, 
on the other hand, about the underlying (theoretical) constructs such as 
motives, attitudes, norms, etc., on the basis of the text. As a result, 
inference in content analysis confines itself only to specific features of 
external and internal validity. 
b. Problems of reliability: here, particular attention is paid to the 
trustworthiness of the coding. The so-called inter-coder reliability 
shows to what extent different coders agree in the coding of the same 
text and intra-coder reliability explains how stable the coding of one 
coder is. ” 
                                                                                                                                
 
74 Webster J and Watson R.T. (2002) . Analysing the past to prepare for the future: Writing a literature review. MIS 
Quarterly, 26 (2), pp 13 
75 Ibid  
76 Hart, C. (1998). Doing a literature review: Releasing the social science research imagination. London,  
UK: Sage Publications. pp1 
77 Webster J and Watson R.T. (2002).Analysing the past to prepare for the future: Writing a literature review. MIS 
Quarterly, 26 (2), pp 13 
78 Titscher S, Meyer M, Wodak R, & Vetter E. (2000). Methods of text and discourse analysis .London: Sage. 
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2.6.1 Validity 
a. External validity 
External validity is the extent to which answers based on the observations 
correctly generalise to other unobserved situations79.  
There are several economic blocks or integrated economic regions in the global 
developing economy context. These integration regions are typically 
characterised by low research output and poor data collection and availability. 
Therefore it is difficult to determine external validity through comparable 
findings. However it is expected that this study is generalizable across regions 
where there is a dominant large economy or regional hegemon such as  in  
ECOWAS (Nigeria) and EAC(Kenya).  
b. Internal validity 
Internal validity is the aspect of validity concerned with whether the underlying 
theoretical concept is adequately answered by the study based on the data 
gathered by the study80.  
This study’s data sources are peer-reviewed texts, as well as publicly available 
historic and policy documents. It is therefore expected that it is internally valid 
as the regional trade policy practice is based on these documents. Also, the 
overall population for regional economic regions within developing economies is 
small. The documents within the context of this study sample a significant 
percentage of that population; therefore findings may be validly used to infer 
conditions across the population.   
This study covers an analysis of all SACU members and as such it is a valid 
study of all members. A student based in any SACU member state can 
therefore come to the same conclusions that this study comes to if they are 
using the same data and documents for analysis. 
                                            
79 Ibid 
80 Ibid 
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2.6.2 Reliability 
The research method has a high degree of inter-coder reliability as the literature 
sources are public and reviewed multiple times by multiple parties and 
agencies.  
2.7 Limitations 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland are all treated as equals in this 
study. They share the problem of being economically and geographically 
dependent on South Africa.  
Identifying the real reasons and motives causing progress and delays in the 
negotiations of the various trade agreements identified in the study is not 
always possible. This is because of the closed nature of the trade negotiation 
process. Papers that critique each agreement exist and have been used but 
they do not always shed light on all the motives of all actors. Only those present 
at the negotiating table have complete insight of the negotiations. Further, even 
when government officials do record proceedings, they do not always reveal all 
the details of negotiating tactics and strategies. Some government statements 
will be used in the analysis but one will be mindful of the subjective nature of 
some of them. 
In terms of theories, it has been necessary to select a few out of many suitable 
theories. It is not possible to cover all areas negotiated in the various trade 
agreements analysed but the main areas of negotiation and contention will be 
covered. Besides data gathering limitations, there is another limitation in the 
theoretical framework used to analyse the information in the study. Most of the 
economic models that are used to measure the impact of a Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) on individual countries are based on conditions in developed 
countries or an analysis of a relationship between a developed country and a 
developing country. This study is examining the impact of one developing 
country’s action on other developing countries, using available methods. The 
results will therefore be carefully interpreted with the understanding that they 
are conditional on the assumption mentioned above.  
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The different SACU treaties will be reviewed and discussed but only as far as 
they have an impact on the relationship between South Africa and BLNS. The 
absence of quality data on BLNS countries at times is a critical constraint on 
conducting economic analysis of them. Some statistics will be incomplete or 
unavailable and although the study will endeavour to use as much accurate 
data as available, it is a reality that some data may be missing. This is the 
reason the study will only use a few analytical methods as  sophisticated 
econometric models demand a lot of data, while simple trade indicators do not. 
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CHAPTER 3. Literature Review 
This study sets out to understand the failures and successes of regional 
integration especially, in the case of SACU. Various studies have been done on 
the relationship between South Africa and the U.S. as well as on SACU and the 
relationship between its members. The majority of research by analysts like 
McCarthy 81, Hichert et al82, Grynberg and Motswapong83, Edwards and 
Lawrence focus on South Africa’s dominant role in SACU and why the other 
countries allow it to continue. 
McCarthy 84 analyses SACU and concludes that the organisation is an unequal 
organ that is built as a “defacto economic integration of politically separate 
members”85.  He adds further that South Africa determines the common 
external tariff and mostly administers its own industrial policy interests 86  . 
Other analysts also share the sentiment that South Africa dominates SACU with 
Hichert et al surmising that   “National interests drive SACU. However, national 
interests reflect the inequalities between South Africa and the BLNS countries 
and as such are causes of conflict in the organisation87.” They add further that 
“the South African political landscape dominates decision making, both political 
and economic, in Southern Africa88.” 
                                            
81 Mc Carthy C. (February 2003). The Southern African Customs Union: Case Study prepared for the Food and 
Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations. http://www.hubrural.org/IMG/pdf/fao_etude_sacu.pdf. Accessed from 23 
April 2013 
s82 Hichert T.Draper P. and Bertelsmann-Scott T.( July 2010). What Does the Future Hold for SACU? From Own Goal to 
Laduma! Scenarios for the Future of the Southern African Customs Union. South African Institute of International Affairs. 
Development Through Trade Programme.Occasional Paper No 63.pg 6 
83 Grynberg R  and Motswapong M. (24 April 2012). SACU Revenue Sharing Formula: Towards a Developmental 
Agreement. BIDPA Working Paper 
84 Ibid  
85 Ibid   
86 Ibid   
87 Hichert T. Draper P. and Bertelsmann-Scott T. (July 2010). What Does the Future Hold for SACU? From Own Goal to 
Laduma! Scenarios for the Future of the Southern African Customs Union. South African Institute of International Affairs 
Development through Trade Programme. Occasional Paper No 63.pg 6 
88 Ibid     
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Edwards and Lawrence 89 agree and state that “South Africa unilaterally 
determined tariffs, while other SACU members were forced to simply fall in 
line.” 
Analysts Grynberg and Motswapong90 concur and argue that South Africa 
consistently places its national interests before SACU and uses SACU as an 
instrument in fulfilling its national agenda. They criticise the fundamental 
revenue sharing structure of SACU as flawed, even after the two reviews of 
1969 and 200291.  They accuse South Africa of giving BLNS countries a new 
formula for revenue sharing without changing the economic relationship of 
dependency on South Africa by BLNS92.  
 
Edwards and Lawrence 93 criticise SACU’s tariff structure as ‘excessively 
complex and opaque and biased against exports’. They argue that the tariffs are 
historic with little consideration for application in the current global economic 
system. They contend further that the current tariff sharing formula is ‘expensive 
and defective’ and BLNS countries would benefit from a tariff structure overhaul 
as they would be able to “access to cheaper inputs and final products94 ”. They 
also call for a separation of the “aid and tariff-revenue sharing components95” 
Phiri warns that the signature of the EPA with the EU by Botswana, Swaziland 
and Lesotho in spite of South Africa and Namibia’s objections shows cracks in 
the unity of SACU96.  
Ruppel highlights the two issues in the current debates about SACU 
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1. The aftermath and fear of SACU disintegrating following the signature of 
the EPA 
2. The danger posed by declining revenues from SACU due to the global 
economic crisis, a worrying trend as these revenues make up a large 
percentage of GDP and foreign exchange, in BLNS countries 97. 
Lehloenya98  explores the SACU- US agreement and its possible benefits for 
SACU members and concludes that it was a reaction by the U.S. to the 
agreement South Africa signed with the European Union (EU).  Fergusson and 
Sek 99 as well as Draper and Khumalo 100 agree.  
Flatters and Stern101, Hentz102 , Edwards et al 103 all discuss the changes 
brought about by the new revenue formula signed in 2002 and implemented in 
2005.  
Hentz104 seeks to explain the attempt at equity by South Africa in giving more 
revenue to BLNS countries than it kept for itself, which Flatters and Stern 105see 
as yet another way to keep the economic dependency of these countries. They 
analyse the effect of the new revenue system and conclude that its 
implementation was disastrous for SACU.  
As outlined above, there are a few studies that critique the negative impact of 
South Africa’s external agreements on SACU but there are none that focus 
exclusively on the impact of the SA – US relationship on other SACU members. 
Of those that do delve into how South Africa’s trade relationships with other 
countries affect BLNS, they focus on the impact of European Union’s trade 
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deals and relationship with South Africa. There is some research and work that 
interrogates the U.S. –S.A. relationship overall but none that look at the trade 
relationship and its impact on BLNS, specifically. Firsing106 , Stremlau107  and 
numerous other authors, for example look at SA-US relations but without really 
tackling the impact on BLNS countries.  
There is debate on whether South Africa is a regional power, hegemon or 
middle power. Flemes defines a regional power as a country that  108 “can be 
distinguished by four pivotal criteria: claim to leadership, power resources, 
employment of foreign policy instruments and acceptance of leadership”. 
According to Ploth109, South Africa fits this description. 
Oden110  assesse South Africa’s historic role on the continent and concludes 
that during apartheid, it was the destabiliser. It became the unifying force, with 
the continent united in its stand against apartheid. He offers that apartheid was 
also an obstacle to regional integration in Africa111 .   
Adebayo and Landsberg highlight the fear of South Africa’s neighbours that the 
country will use its military and economic power to the detriment of its smaller 
trade partners. They theorise that this was and continues to be an obstacle to 
the country becoming a hegemon112. They conclude that South Africa is not a 
“hegemon” but rather a “pivotal state” 113.  
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Alden and Le Pere 114, disagree and claim South Africa is actually a hegemon 
albeit, on a shoestring.  Jordaan 115 on the other hand, positions the country as 
an emerging “middle power” and distinguishes between a traditional and 
emerging middle power. According to him, S.A. is an emerging middle power as 
middle powers have a good reputation and are seen to be neutral actors in the 
global political system.  
Flemes116 postulates that South Africa is a co-operative hegemon as it seeks to 
reform and change the global economic system. Hentz 117 sums up the debate 
and argues that South Africa is neither a hegemon nor a middle power but has 
a combined strategy of a co-operative hegemon and also plays a 
developmental role on the continent.  
Hentz 118 , as discussed earlier, also provides a context for this when he 
outlines the development of South Africa’s foreign policy and the three policy 
choices considered. He describes the changes in ideology that took place in the 
ANC during the transition. Terreblanche119  also interrogates, these ideological 
changes and the impact they had on the South Africa’s foreign policy. 
Peterson 120argues that the main difference in foreign policy between the 
apartheid and the post-apartheid government is the new government’s 
willingness to liberalise markets.  
On US-SA relations, Stremlau121 points to the high level delegations that visited 
South Africa every three months from 1994-2000 as evidence of great relations 
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between the two countries. Fabricius122 suggests that the relationship was 
initiated and led by the U.S. He also adds that it had an impact on the country’s 
relations with its allies and trade partners. He argues that the 123 U.S. expected 
democracy; regional leadership and a trade partner from South Africa, which did 
its best to comply at all times. He characterises the South Africa’s approach to 
the U.S. as ambivalent as the country constantly battled with accusations of 
being a puppet of the U.S. He summarises South Africa’s view of the 
relationship as  
 “On the one hand it was flattered by all the attention from the world's greatest 
power. On the other hand, it was rather overwhelmed by all the energy and 
effort of American diplomatic overtures.” 
Morisson 124 notes the change in tone of the relationship in the early 2000’s 
following disagreements with the South Africa government on the provision of 
HIV/AIDS medication and on how to deal with Zimbabwe. 
3.1 Theoretical Framework – New regionalism 
Both U.S. and SA are powerhouses, the U.S., globally and S.A. in the region. 
The complexity presented by each country’s status and or position on the world 
economy will form part of this study as it is important in assessing the impact of 
SA’s trade relationship with the US on its smaller trade partners, BLNS.  
The international political economy (IPE) framework will be the theoretical basis 
of this study. Regionalism and in particular, new regionalism will be the main 
theory used.  
New regionalism is a response to the multipolar, globalised world. As such, it 
requires that “the integration project should be market-driven and outward-
looking, should avoid high levels of protection and should form part of the 
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ongoing globalisation and internationalisation process of the world political 
economy125” This makes new regionalism a good fit for a study of South Africa 
as the country, sought to do away with the protectionism of the apartheid era 
and liberalise their markets. 
Telo 126offers that one of the reasons for regionalism is “the desire of less 
developed countries to gradually cope with global competition by cooperating 
and converging with regional leaders”. This explanation goes some way into 
explaining why BLNS countries, continue to be members of SACU even when 
analysts suggest that regional leader South Africa’s interests dominate the 
organisation. 
Regionalism falls under the study of International Political Economy (IPE), 
which concerns itself with the relationship between politics and economics, as 
well as the relationship between states and markets.  
Hettne and Inotai 127 define a region in the following ways:  
“a) from an economic point of view, a region is a zone within which there is 
more intensive cooperation between the countries than their relations with the 
rest of the world.  
b) Geographically, a region is a specific area of political cooperation and/or 
conflictive relationships.” 
They trace the origins of regional integration to the failure of global structures to 
intervene and solve regional conflicts. They also posit that the establishment of 
the United States of America in the 18th century inspired other regions to seek 
unity and a grouping of their own countries, from Europe, to Latin America and 
the African continent128. These efforts then led to post- World War II efforts at 
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regional integration for political, economic and other reasons like the OAU, 
NATO, Arab League and others. In the post-Cold War era, there emerged a 
multi-polar world where the United States and Russia no longer had interest in 
intervening in global issues, like Soviet Union did in the Cold War era129.   
Regional integration was initially proposed as the solution to regional and 
therefore global economic co-operation and prosperity. However, in the 1980’s 
this view changed as there was a fear that,  
“the global trading system may disintegrate into a number of trading blocs, 
regional integration groups, or special cooperation zones which would usher in 
new forms of competition and conflict.” 
The fear was that these groups would make global co-operation in the global 
economic system impossible as each group would seek out solutions that best 
suited them and were in their interest. To a certain extent this fear has come 
true with WTO talks, especially the Doha Round, stalling because of the 
unwavering stance of different regional trade groups. 
Mistry130 argues that second generation Regional Integration Agreements or 
new regionalism is better than those of the nineties because they:  
a) “Involve greater diversity among regional members 
b) Have different objectives with an outward orientation 
c) Go beyond trade liberalisation in goods subject to GATT 
regulations to include liberalization of trade in services, 
investment, technical, and regulatory standards, customs 
formalities and government procurement practices 
                                            
129 Hettne and Inotai. (1994 ).The New Regionalism: Implications for Global Development and International Security 
UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER).pp viii 
130 Mistry, P.1996. Regional Integration Arrangements in Economic Development, Panacea or Pitfall? The Hague: 
Forum on Debt and Development.26 
 
46
d) Are more outward – looking in aiming to achieve or maintain the 
global competitiveness of the region as a whole and that of its 
members 
e) Are based on a partnership amongst members which have 
already carried out significant unilateral trade liberalization and; 
f) Have developed a more North – South character instead of the 
North – North and South – South arrangements that characterized 
earlier integration efforts.” 
He argues that it is different to the old regionalism because it focused on two 
main principles, trade creation and trade diversion without taking into account 
other factors. 
These concepts are explained in Gosha and Yamarik as: 
“Trade creation occurs as low-cost member countries displace high-cost 
domestic producers”131 
“Trade diversion, on the other hand, occurs when members of a trading bloc 
reorient their trade away from low-cost, non-member countries towards higher-
cost, member countries.”132 
Mistry criticizes the Vinerian133 framework as it “only focuses on static 
efficiency gains”, he adds further that “it is too partial and inadequate for 
evaluating unorthodox or dynamic gains.” 
New regionalism is relevant to this study as it deals with domestic factors, the 
ambitions of smaller states and the interests of business in seeking out regional 
co-operation134.  
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  Hettne and Inotai 135 question, “Whether or not regionalism will be able to 
provide greater security for smaller nations against the actions of regional 
hegemonies than global institutions have been able to achieve”.  
This is a criticism of regionalism as it suggests that the regional institutions may 
disadvantage smaller members even further. 
This is one of the questions at the crux of this study, did smaller nations, namely 
BLNS countries get impacted in any way by the actions of regional hegemon 
South Africa when it interacted with the U.S.  
Mistry argues that, 
“the success of RIAs must be judged on economic as well as non-
economic grounds and be based on the right choice of partners. Such 
choices cannot be based in lofty political aspirations or in notions of 
solidarity but in opportunities based on realistic and attainable economic 
objectives”136 
He adds further that RIA’s must not adopt, “a framework for co-operation 
inappropriate to economic realities”137 
New regionalism was used to understand why South Africa maintained the 
trade partnerships it did, especially SACU and why it sought out the new 
relationships it did.  
In summary, proponents of new regionalism like Cooke and Morgan, Florida , 
Storper, Scott in Harrison138 argue that it is the solution to the current system of 
capitalism, they argue that “its territorial configuration are best regulated and 
governed in and through the decentralisation of socio-economic decision-
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making and associated policy implementation to sub-national institutional 
frameworks and supports” 
New Regionalism is criticised for being ambiguous in that “it remains unclear 
what it exactly is, how it takes form and what is so new about it139.” Lovering 
criticises new regionalism for only focusing on the only positive aspects of 
regionalism and ignoring the negative aspects and impact on smaller 
countries140. 
Proponents of new regionalism point out the fact that old regionalism theories 
were based on Europe and America’s experiences of regionalism as a 
weakness or criticism. Meanwhile, new regionalism is criticised for not 
sufficiently explaining the complexities of levels or scales of regionalisation. 
Regional integration takes different forms and has certain levels of integration 
with some arrangements having deeper levels of integration than others141.  
Hettne142 argues that there are different kinds of regionalisms tackled by new 
regionalism, namely trade blocs, monetary regionalism (which he says has 
been ignored), developmental regionalism and security regionalism. He argues 
that some of these regionalisms have been ignored by old and new regionalism 
because of their focus on trade. Lovering143 on the other hand, says new 
regionalists have overlooked many significant influences on the economic 
dynamics of many regions. 
3.2 Summary 
A thorough literature review was conducted to understand the scope of the 
study and some criticisms have emerged. The main criticism of the literature 
reviewed is that although literature exists on SACU, there isn’t enough of it, 
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especially considering that it has been around for more than a century. Of the 
literature that does exist, there is an unbalanced focus on analysing the actions 
of South Africa as the biggest member of the grouping. There is little analysis of 
the actions of the other individual BLNS countries or BLNS as a grouping and 
its impact on SA. There is also no literature that analyses the impact of South 
Africa’s agreements, outside of the analysis of the EU agreement mentioned 
earlier.  
For a country as big and of such global importance to the continent and the 
world economic system, there is little analysis on individual agreements that 
South Africa enters into. Where there is analysis it is conducted by the same 
organisations e.g. SAIIA and TRALAC, which limits the variety of opinions about 
the agreements, their potential and impact. 
A critical analysis of literature on South African foreign policy is also problematic 
as it paints a picture that is too ‘binary’. Lipton points out the mantra of 
analysing policy as having … 
“‘shifted from Mandela’s idealism to Mbeki’s realism’. The problem with 
analysing foreign policy within this narrow binary framework is evident 
from the fact that Mandela’s policy contained major elements of realpolitik, 
such as the withdrawal of recognition from Taiwan in 1997 under pressure 
from China. Meanwhile, Mbeki’s policy had major elements of ‘idealism’. 
Indeed, Mbeki’s policy was probably more ideologically driven than 
Mandela’s.144” 
In the time that South Africa entered the global economy, much had changed in 
the global order. Major players had shifted with historic events like the end of 
the Cold War era and the fall of the Berlin Wall to mention a few. This meant 
that communism and to certain extent socialism as ideologies suffered a huge 
setback as global capitalism became the new economic mantra.  
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This context is missing in a lot of articles and books that purport to be seeking 
to understand South Africa’s foreign policy decisions. There is reference to how 
the global economy was and what was expected of new entrants but no 
recognition of the little choice that South Africa had on terms of entry. There are 
also those analysts who posit that South Africa did attempt to change the 
system they were entering, in spite of evidence to the contrary. The role of the 
South African government and in particular, that of former South African 
presidents Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki’s fight for changes to WTO, World 
Bank and other international financial institutions (IFI’s) rules as well as the calls 
for debt relief for the developing world is not given the necessary credit. 
Achievements like fighting for a change in the structure of the Security Council 
and South Africa’s subsequent membership are mentioned as small victories 
instead of the big institutional shake-ups that they were to the global political 
system.  
 
51
CHAPTER 4. UNDERSTANDING UNITED STATES – 
SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the relationship between the United States and South 
Africa. Initially, the relationship between the two countries during the apartheid 
era is discussed and at a later stage, the relationship during the democratic era 
is discussed. The main differences between pre and post-democratic relations 
are highlighted. An analysis of disputes between the two countries is also 
undertaken to understand the depth of the relationship and all its multiple 
dynamics. Instruments such as the US –SA Binational Commission, AGOA, 
GATT and the US-SA TIFA are also critically analysed in order to explain their 
use and purpose in the relationship.  
4.2 Post-apartheid South Africa and the United States as 
trade partners  
The main priority of the newly formed South African government was economic 
growth. Du Plessis and Smit describe the state of the economy at 
independence as thus,  
“Trade and financial sanctions and internal political opposition to the apartheid 
government had contributed to the poorest ten year growth performance (1984 
– 1993) since the Second World War and the removal of these constraints was 
widely expected to transform the country’s economic performance145.” 
The new government sought to fix the economy and opened up its markets, 
signing many bilateral and multinational agreements, such that by 2006, more 
than “40 bilateral treaties designed to promote and protect foreign 
                                            
145 Du Plessis S and Smit B.(2006). Economic Growth in South Africa since 1994. Stellenbosch Economic Working 
Papers Vol 1.pp1-33 
 
 
52
investment”146 had been signed. Peterson 147argues that this is the main 
difference in foreign policy between the apartheid and the post-apartheid 
government.  
Peterson148 argues further, that the democratic government needed these 
bilateral agreements to fulfil the objectives of Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution strategy (GEAR)149. This economic strategy was criticised as too 
close to neo-liberal economics and too removed from the socialist leanings that 
the ANC entered the negotiations with. 
It was in this climate that the US began intensifying efforts to ensure South 
Africa was an important trade partner. By the end of 2003, US officials recorded 
that … 
“The United States is the largest single-country source of new foreign 
investment in South Africa since the country’s 1994 transition to democracy. 
More than 900 U.S. companies and more than 400 U.S. subsidiaries and 
franchises are operating in South Africa150” 
Stremlau151 highlights the fact that there was an American foreign delegation 
visit to South Africa every three months from 1994-2000 as evidence of the 
robust nature of the relationship between the two countries. Not only were the 
visits, but they came from leaders of U.S. Republicans and Democrats. Each 
visiting delegate sought prominence, a sign that American government officials 
placed importance on a having good relationship with South Africa152. The 
American public also agreed with a 1998 public opinion survey in the U.S. 
ranking South Africa amongst the most admired countries in the world. The 
feeling was mutual in South Africa, a public opinion poll ranked the importance 
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of a relationship with the U.S. as secondary only to good relations with S.A.’s 
neighbours153. 
Fabricius154 suggests that from the beginning of the democratic era, the U.S. led 
the relationship between the two countries. He adds further that the relationship 
went on to define how S.A interacted with its other trade partners, particularly 
those in its regional integration schemes like the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), South African Customs Union (SACU) and others. 
Langdon155 confirms that the U.S. was strategic and purposeful in its dealings 
with South Africa and describes how within a year of anti-apartheid sanctions 
ending in 1993, the Americans sent a delegation. 
According Fabricius156, the U.S. knew what it wanted from South Africa.   
“It wanted South Africa to become a successful free market democracy, to 
provide markets for US goods in South Africa, and to become the agent for 
stability and the engine for growth in the region so as to expand those markets 
and to diminish US responsibility for dealing with humanitarian crises.” 
As stated above, the U.S. also wanted South Africa to take over the reins of 
humanitarian crisis intervention on the continent. This is in the context of the 
tragic, failed intervention in Somalia in 1992, known as Black Hawk Down. 
Ironically, South Africa played this role so well, that it faced accusations of being 
a puppet of the U.S. This had the effect of making South Africa reluctant or 
“unsure” of its decisions when dealing with the U.S. It was constantly watching 
over its back at each point to ensure that it did not anger or become 
misunderstood by its regional and southern alliance partners.  Fabricus 157 
highlights the influence of the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the 
other ANC allies, who added to South African official’s ambivalence. 
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The post-Cold War era or hangover of the nineties, placed countries into 
communist/socialist/pro-poor vs capitalist/pro-American camps. This did not 
have a positive impact on how South Africa’s relationship with the US was 
viewed by its partners in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world. The fact 
that the relationship was taking place in an era when potential investors and 
multilateral organisations set rules for entry that included, liberalisation, 
privatisation and tax reforms, which South Africa made huge efforts to comply to 
158also provided fuel for the South Africa is an agent of the US thesis. As a 
result, South African policy makers were fearful of being bulldozed into 
decisions that infringe on the sovereignty of SA and its neighbours. This also 
led to a fear of agreeing with the US too often. South African officials knew they 
wanted to push for aid assistance from the US as well as trade but they weren’t 
sure what terms and conditions it would be accompanied by159.  
Fabricius 160 identifies the Armscor case as the first indication of what can be 
characterised as South Africa’s schizophrenic relationship with U.S., at times 
great friends but always wary of being seen as a sell-out and traitor by its anti- 
Western allies.  
He also identifies the conference to renew the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) as the point at which the relationship matured and S.A. balanced its 
schizophrenia. At the conference South Africa medicated between the U.S. and 
NAM countries161.  
The relationship between South Africa and the U.S. was at its best in the period 
after independence in the early 90’s and matured over time. By the late 2000’s, 
it had become a normal trade relationship with the expected ups and downs162.   
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There is also a notable difference in how South Africa was viewed under 
Mandela – who was voted the fourth most admired leader by Americans163 and 
Thabo Mbeki’s presidential tenure, especially his second term. The 
controversial stance of President Thabo Mbeki on HIV/AIDS and South Africa’s 
stance on Zimbabwe, lost the country many supporters in the U.S. and proved 
to be a point of conflict on numerous world stages and events164. Morisson 
165described the change as thus:  “US commitment towards and affection for 
South Africa endured but at a lower heat”  
Although the U.S. and South Africa, have had disputes, that almost led to 
diplomatic crises, they agreed on a number of important issues and this kept 
their partnership going. They agreed on the need to for strong institutions of 
democracy as precursor for economic growth, trade and investment as well as 
the need to advance peace and security whilst promoting development and 
many other issues166. As already highlighted earlier, the U.S. also understood 
that South Africa’s role in the continent would be useful in helping them grow on 
the continent too.  The graph below shows the growth in trade. 
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Table 4: South Africa - US trade flows 2000 - 2012 Source: Department of Trade and Industry (South Africa) 
 
4.3 South Africa and AGOA 
“Apart from the World Trade Organisation (WTO)'s most favoured nation (MFN) 
tariff system, two important preferential trade schemes govern the bulk of South 
Africa's exports to the US: the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and 
the Generalised System of Preferences. The challenge, however, is that these 
two schemes are unilateral in nature and can be theoretically withdrawn at any 
time 167 ” 
Williams 168  defines the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) as “a non-
reciprocal trade preference program that provides duty-free treatment to US 
imports of certain products from eligible sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries.” 
 The Generalized System of Preference (GSP), is the exception to the Most 
Favoured Nation Principle under World Trade Organisation rules. It is a 
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programme that gives special trade preferences to developing countries169. 
Developed countries like the US have the programme and more than a 120 
developing countries benefit. The programme was signed into action in 1971 
but began in the U.S. in 1976 170. The main difference between AGOA and GSP 
is that AGOA “covers more products and includes additional eligibility criteria 
beyond those in GSP. Additionally, AGOA includes trade and development 
provisions beyond its duty-free preferences171” Unlike AGOA, GSP did not 
include most textiles and apparel and other products172.” 
The AGOA programme began in May 2000, when the US set out to develop a 
new trade relationship with developing countries, and it is set to expire in 
September 2015173. It represented a change in power dynamics and 
perceptions of the US as noted by Schneidman and Lewis who categorise pre-
AGOA relations as “defined largely by Cold War calculations, donor-recipient 
relations, aid for poverty alleviation and emergency relief174.” 
However, it is not a blank cheque nor an unconditional gift from the US. Its main 
objectives, according to Schneidman and Lewis175 are increasing democratic 
governance and economic progress or growth.  To this end the US required 
“adherence to the rule of law, due process, political plurality, anti-corruption 
measures and a market economy176” as a conditions for participating in AGOA. 
Various countries have been removed from AGOA for failing to meet these 
requirements.  
In the year 2000, when the programme was started, Africa was not an important 
trade partner but it is increasingly becoming an important player in the global 
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economy with increasing competition from regions outside the U.S. The 
programme also aims to improve trade, increase investment and employment 
opportunities between the US and African countries177. In 2002, ‘AGOA II’ was 
launched and aimed for “substantially improved access for imports from 
beneficiary sub-Saharan African countries178.”  
US officials believe that,  
“by providing duty-free entry into the United States for almost all African 
products, AGOA has helped expand and diversify African exports to the 
United States while at the same time fostering an improved business 
environment in many African countries.179” 
In the first ten years of AGOA, 300,000 new jobs were created in Africa at an 
average of over 30,000 new jobs per year180. South Africa is the biggest non-oil 
beneficiary, with the most diversified exports, of all of AGOA’s thirty seven 
eligible countries181.  Since the begging of AGOA, U.S. exports to South Africa 
have grown to US$ 7.5 billion.182 
The country also benefited in other ways183, 
 “Automotive vehicles, machinery, iron, steel, platinum, diamonds, and 
ores as well as citrus fruit, wine, footwear are the biggest exports from 
South Africa to the U.S. 
 South Africa went from having only US$ 417 million in exports in 2001 to 
having about US $ 1.7 billion dollars by 2008184.   
                                            
177 Ibid 
178 (2004) .Trade and Policy Agenda 2003 Annual Report http://www.sice.oas.org/ctyindex/USA/2004Rep_e.pdf 
179 (2010). Trade and Policy Agenda and 2009 Annual Report. http://www.ustr.gov/2010-trade-policy-agenda 
180 Ibid 
181 Marantis D. (7 June 2011). AGOA: The foundation of US-SA Trade. Accessed from  
http://www.saiia.org.za/presentations-speeches/agoa-the-foundation-of-us-sa-trade-ambassador-demetrios-marantis. 
Accessed from 20 March 2013   
182 Firsing S.T. (31 July 2012). Special Report: Hillary Clinton in South Africa – Unpacking US-South Africa relations. 
Accessed from  http://www.saiia.org.za/opinion-analysis/special-report-hillary-clinton-in-south-africa-%E2%80%93-
unpacking-us-south-africa-relations Retrieved from 24 April 2013 
183 Páez L, Karingi S, Kimenyi M, Paulos M. (15 July 2010). A Decade (2000-2010) of African-US Trade under the 
African Growth Opportunities Act (AGOA): Challenges, Opportunities and a Framework for Post-AGOA Engagement. 
pp19 
 
59
 Customs procedures have been standardized 
 Diversified exports to include agricultural products, an achievement most 
African countries are still grappling with 
 Automobile and transport related exports from South Africa to the US 
have risen from US$148 million to US$1.9 billion185” 
South Africa is not the only benefactor of AGOA. It has been important to the 
economy of Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. Its main effect is that “during the 
last 10 years, on average more than 70 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s exports 
to the U.S. have been duty free under AGOA or GSP186” 
In terms of BLNS countries, 
 “In Lesotho, AGOA spurred a vibrant textile and apparel industry that is 
the country's largest private sector employer with 36,000 workers187” 
 “Lesotho and Swaziland became leading exporters of apparel and 
textiles to the U.S.188” 
 “The Lesotho garment industry produces over 26 million pairs of jeans to 
service the US and South African markets. The industry has existed in 
Lesotho for three decades placing Lesotho at first position in supplying 
the US market with garments.189” 
 Botswana's beef and cattle sector was strengthened   
Trade data indicates that in the period 2001 -2008 alone, Botswana went from 
no trade to US $16 thousand, whilst Lesotho went from US $ 129 million to US 
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$ 339 million, Namibia went from zero trade to US $ 28 million in 2007 and 
Swaziland went from U $8 thousand US $ 124 million190. 
Overall AGOA is lauded as a success as:  
“The volume of AGOA imports has increased 500 percent, from $8.15 billion in 
2001 to$53.8 billion in 2011, and non-energy AGOA imports have increased 
275 percent, from $1.2 billion to $4.5 billion.191”  
According to the Department of Trade and Industry analysis, South African 
exports that entered the United States under AGOA and GSP make up 43% of 
total exports in 2012192. Almost half of South Africa’s goods entered the country 
duty free and or had zero rated tariff duties.  
The graph below shows the overall advantage received by South Africa from 
AGOA and GSP. 
 
Figure 3: South African exports to the US under AGOA, MFN and GSP in 2012 Source: US International Trade 
Commission 
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The impact of these two instruments is huge, as a result of them,  “South 
Africa’s tariff lines fell from over 12 000 at the beginning of the 1990s to 6500 in 
2006 193.”   
The advantages of AGOA are many and well documented: 
“Eligible countries exported nearly $35 billion in products to the United States 
under AGOA in 2012, and that total exports have risen 300 percent since the 
program's start. While about 84 percent of products were petroleum (oil from 
places like Nigeria), the program has also helped promote other, value-added 
exports such as apparel, footwear, agricultural products and cars194 . ” 
However the programme is not without its critics. One of the main criticisms is 
that the programme has created a high dependence on the U.S. for trade, such 
that countries like Lesotho and Swaziland are vulnerable to global economic 
changes195. 
It has also been criticised for only resulting in a tiny portion of African exports 
going into the U.S. compared to the full access for U.S. companies that it 
demands in return.  Only 2% of the total imports into the U.S. are products that 
come in under AGOA, with South Africa being the biggest benefactor outside of 
oil, and one with the most diverse range of products196. South Africa’s role as 
the biggest non-oil benefactor of AGOA forms the basis of the argument by 
American companies lobbying for the removal of South Africa. They argue that 
the country has a middle income status and should not be benefiting from U.S. 
market access more than poorer countries like Bangladesh for example197.  
AGOA has also been criticised and accused of being an instrument used by 
America and its companies to force the hands of AGOA recipients to fulfil 
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America’s national interest. Proponents of this argument point to the case of 
United States poultry and security industries calling for the removal of South 
Africa from AGOA as a result of a dispute over poultry anti-dumping duties and 
South Africa’s new bill that proposes to stop foreign ownership of security 
companies. In the dispute over poultry, in retaliation for the introduction of anti-
dumping duties, “lobbyists in the US have been trying to get South Africa 
excluded from AGOA, which is vital for the local automotive industry198." The 
dispute over poultry is a long-standing disagreement which began in 2000 when 
South Africa released an anti-dumping order against imports of some U.S. 
poultry products199 By 2008, some products had been removed but four still 
remained on the list namely: chicken meat portions, L-lysine HCL, suspension 
polyvinyl chloride(PVC) and acetaminophenol 200. Ever since the dispute began, 
poultry producing companies in the U.S. have been calling for South Africa to 
be removed from AGOA under the argument that South African poultry farmers 
get duty free access to their market but U.S. companies are not afforded the 
same rights in South Africa.  
South Africa recently announced the proposal of a bill that seeks to enforce a 
rule that 51% of security company ownership must be local. The Security 
Industry Association (SIA) in the U.S. wrote a letter to senators to “suggest 
putting pressure on South Africa through amendments to the African Growth 
and Opportunity Act (AGOA) if the South African bill were to become law201” 
They also made the argument that South Africa had free access to their industry 
and were meant to provide free access to American firms in return but this bill 
goes against that. 
African supporters of AGOA want it to continue indefinitely as they believe their 
countries benefit from the programme. A working group of African Ambassadors 
met with Congress in 2012 and presented its AGOA wish list and called for the 
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programme to be extended by another 15 years202. Only time will tell if AGOA 
will be extended when it comes up for renewal in 2015 and whether South 
Africa, will still be included, should it be extended. 
4.4 The U.S. – S.A. Binational Commission and the US-SA 
TIFA 
As already mentioned, South Africa has no binding bilateral trade agreement 
with the United States, it only gains market access through AGOA, the MFN 
programme and GSP. U.S. - South Africa relations initially took place under the 
US-SA Binational Commission, nicknamed the ‘Gore-Mbeki Commission’ (BNC) 
203. This was set up in March 1995 when Al Gore and Thabo Mbeki were deputy 
presidents of US and SA respectively204. It was the main institution where all the 
rules of engagement, discussions and relations between South Africa and the 
United States happened205.  
Various important gains were made through the Commission.  
Table 5: Main gains made through the bi-national commission 
Area of Co-operation  Co-operation actions 
Organized crime, drugs, 
trafficking and money 
laundering 
“People and resources from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA), Customs and the Bureau of International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement (INL). In addition, we put together an inter-agency co-ordination 
group to provide assistance in a wide variety of law enforcement and intelligence 
gathering areas”206 
Ease of doing business in S.A. 
and U.S.  
“ leaders in business and  government to work together to develop policy incentives 
and eliminate disincentives to trade and investment. Tax treaties have been signed, 
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markets have been opened, technology shared and practices and policies changed 
because of the work of the BNC207” 
Maths and Science teaching  “an agreement to bring Peace Corps volunteers to teach maths and science in 
South African schools serving the majority population208.” 
Housing and Energy Efficiency  “Energy-efficient homes are under construction because of the leadership of our 
Energy department under the auspices of the Binational Commission209.” 
Information Sharing  “One of the best examples of information sharing is the early warning given the 
South African government on the coming impact of El Nino on the Southern African 
climate. That information has not only helped South Africa to plan for the 
forthcoming drought, but it can now help predict where there are likely to be 
malaria outbreaks as well.210” 
Working Group on African and 
Global Issues  
“South Africa and the United States work together on a range issues impacting the 
region and the world…In 2012, we inaugurated a formalized mechanism for 
discussing cooperation, including non-proliferation, climate change, human rights, 
developments in Iran and Syria, and regional crises in Zimbabwe, Somalia, Sudan 
and South Sudan, and the Sahel. 211” 
Health “The United States has made an unwavering commitment to South Africans living 
with HIV/AIDS. Since 2004, we invested more than $3.2 billion in South Africa 
through PEPFAR, including over $500 million in 2012. In 2009-10, the U.S. 
government provided $120 million to prevent a stock-out of antiretroviral drugs and 
technical assistance that reduced the cost of such vital medications by half through 
a new procurement model. Hundreds of thousands of lives have been saved, 6.8 
million individuals have received counselling and testing, 720,000 pregnant women 
access services to prevent mother-to-child transmission, and 1.7 million individuals 
receive antiretroviral treatment. Through the Partnership Framework Implementation 
Plan announced in August, the United States will continue to play a strong 
supporting over the next five years as South Africa takes the lead in caring for those 
living with HIV/AIDS. 
Another sign of our mutually beneficial cooperation on health was the recent launch 
of a Global Disease Detection Center, co-directed by the U.S. Center for Disease 
Control and South Africa’s National Institute for Communicable Diseases, the only 
such center co-directed by a host country. 212” 
Education  “On November 2012, we launched the $7.5 million School Capacity Innovation 
Program (SCIP), a public-private partnership between USAID, the ELMA Foundation 
and J.P. Morgan designed in collaboration with the Department of Basic Education 
to improve teacher quality. 
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In August 2012, Secretary Clinton announced a $500 million Opportunity Grants 
Program for South Africa to help disadvantaged students study at U.S. universities. 
This is in addition to the over $12 million that the U.S. Government currently 
provides for graduate-level Fulbright scholarships and other exchange and speaker 
programs. 
The U.S. Government operates a series of reading rooms and information centres in 
Soweto, Mamelodi, Pretoria, Pietermaritzburg, Bloemfontein, Cape Town, Durban, 
and Johannesburg to provide current information to students. 213” 
Energy  “South Africa and the United States share a commitment to developing clean, 
renewable, and efficient energy technologies. A recent $2 billion agreement was 
signed between the U.S. Export-Import Bank (EX-IM) and South Africa’s Industrial 
Development Corporation to provide credit guarantees for the development of the 
renewable energy sector. In February 2012, EX-IM signed an $805.6 million loan 
with South African utility company Eskom for the purchase of engineering and 
management services related to a new coal-fired plant. The Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (OPIC) will support U.S. companies to develop renewable 
energy programs in South Africa. 214” 
Rule of Law and Democratic 
Governance 
“Over the next five years, USAID will invest $32.1 million to democratic governance 
programs throughout the region. 
The U.S. government is also spending $1.7 million on bilateral law enforcement 
programs this year and committed an additional $2 million in each of the following 
two years to provide training and support to South African government departments 
for victim empowerment, combating sexual and gender-based violence, border and 
port security, judicial capacity building, financial crimes, fraud detection, consumer 
protection, corruption, fugitive apprehension, LGBT rights, anti-terrorism assistance 
and women’s justice and empowerment. 
A partnership between USAID, the MAC AIDS Foundation and the South African 
government is combating the scourge of gender-based violence through the 
expansion of Thuthuzela Care Centers in South Africa and in the region. These 
centres provide counselling, medical and legal services to survivors of such 
violence. 
The United States and South Africa cooperate to bolster democracy in the region 
through 14 trilateral assistance projects that provide expertise to nine countries in 
Africa on gender-based violence prevention, natural resource management and 
constitutionalism in post-conflict areas. For example, USAID has partnered with 
South Africa's Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and the University of South 
Africa to provide training to elections bodies, including for the South Sudan High 
Elections Committee, a critical institution in Africa's newest democracy. 215” 
Military Co-operation “Military cooperation has long been institutionalized through the U.S.-South Africa 
Defense Committee, which has met on a regular basis since 1997. The visit of 
South African Minister of Defense Mapisa-Nqakula to Washington in September 
2012 for a meeting with U.S. Secretary of Defense Panetta signals the strength of 
this enduring relationship. 
We will build on the success of Exercise Shared Accord 11 during the next Shared 
Accord combined military exercise in July 2013, which will strengthen our nations’ 
capacity to conduct humanitarian operations. 216”  
Environment “In 2011, we worked closely with South Africa at the COP 17 to move all parties 
toward a meaningful outcome on climate change. Several recent bilateral grants 
help address our shared concerns, including a USAID program to assist with water 
management in the Limpopo and Orange-Senqu trans-boundary river basins. 
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The United States is committed to stopping wildlife trafficking, a national security, 
public health and economic security issue that spans continents. The U.S. 
government is providing policy and technical assistance to countries world-wide, 
including South Africa, to improve awareness, surveillance, detection, law 
enforcement, and prosecutions.217” 
 
At the pinnacle of relations through the Commission, the U.S – S.A. Trade and 
Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) was signed in 1999218.  
This was an opportune time to have access to the U.S. market because “...the 
outstanding high investment and consumption growth in the United States 
resulted in an expansion of imports of goods and services of more than 10% in 
both nominal and real terms219 . 
Some of the objectives of the TIFA of 1999 as set out in the agreement are that 
both countries will seek to: 
 “…. take appropriate measures to encourage and facilitate the exchange of 
goods and services and to secure favorable conditions for long-term 
development and diversification of trade between the two countries…..  .220” 
According to Ferguson and Sek, TIFAs are seen as the first steps towards the 
negotiation of a Free Trade Agreement221.  
The SA- US Trade Agreement of 1999 set out to, 
(1)…. expand trade in goods and services between them, within the framework 
and terms of this agreement. 
(2) …take appropriate measures to encourage and facilitate the exchange of 
goods and services, and to secure favorable conditions for long-term 
development and diversification of trade between the two countries. 
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(3) …...encourage private sector investment between the two countries, as a 
means of furthering growth, job creation, and economic development, and, to 
this end, will promote an open and predictable environment for investment and 
facilitate expanded contacts between their respective private sectors. 
Even though the TIFA was signed, work continued under the Commission but it 
was then abandoned as soon as President George Bush became president in 
2001. As outlined in the table above, one of its biggest accomplishments was 
the ability to bring South African and United States diplomats together to 
discuss issues of possible mutual co-operation. South Africa also received 
much needed help through the commission but there was no real trade action 
taken as a result of the agreement.  The TIFA was a general cooperation 
agreement and not a trade agreement as it did not contain any market access 
and or tariff concessions. It was signed in 1999 but ended in 2002 with the 
signature of the SACU Agreement which introduced, Article 31 of the 2002 
SACU Agreement which established a Common Negotiating Mechanism 
(CNM). Under this clause “no individual SACU Member State can enter into a 
preferential trade agreement with a third party without the prior consent of all 
the other Member States222.”  
In spite of the end of the TIFA, South Africa continued to receive Foreign Direct 
Investment from the United States as shown in the table below. 
Table 6: South Africa - US FDI and related indicator trends Source: BEA, U.S. Direct Investment Abroad: 
Selected Items by Detailed Country, 2007-2011”; and CRS calculations   
 2008 2009 2010 2011
 
US FDI Stocks ($ billions) 
 
5.00 
 
5.81 
 
6.47 
 
6.55 
 
U.S. Financial Flows into South Africa ($ millions ) 
 
 
306 
 
410 
 
779 
 
722 
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4.5 Disputes between the U.S. and South Africa 
Various issues have become points of disagreement between the U.S. and S.A. 
These include South Africa’s relationships with old allies, Cuba and Iran, both of 
which made the U.S. uncomfortable and other political ideology differences223. 
Over the course of the relationship, there have been many disputes and these 
have been highlighted in the table below.  
Table 7: Disputes between the Unites States and South Africa 
Issue Description 
South Africa as champion of 
the South  
“South Africa has close relationships with countries that exert their independence from 
the West. Some of the relationships that have resulted in major conflict between South 
Africa and the U.S. include Cuba, Iran and Iraq. Former South African President 
Nelson Mandela was vocal in his opposition to what he viewed as U.S. unilateralism 
on Iraq224” 
AFRICOM’s location in Africa “Some South African officials expressed opposition to the Bush Administration’s initial 
proposal to locate the new U.S. combatant command, Africa Command or AFRICOM, 
on the continent225” 
Anti-dumping In December 2000, an antidumping order against imports of certain U.S. poultry 
products was issued.  
By 2008, South Africa maintained antidumping duties on four U.S. products: chicken 
meat portions, L-lysine HCL, suspension polyvinyl chloride (PVC), and 
acetaminophenol U.S. exporters of chicken parts argue that the antidumping 
measures against their products should be discontinued, consistent with a September 
2007 ruling by South Africa’s Supreme Court of Appeal concerning the calculation of 
the deadline for initiating a sunset review of antidumping measures226. 
Telecoms monopoly “South Africa’s basic telecommunications monopoly, Telkom, and its failure to provide 
facilities necessary for U.S. value-added network services (VANS) providers to 
operate and expand227” 
Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) 
“U.S. companies generally support the objectives of South Africa’s Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) policies, which are intended to promote the economic 
empowerment of the historically disadvantaged population in South Africa. However, 
some US companies have expressed concern about the scope and implementation of 
BEE. For example, there are concerns about BEE policies requiring the transfer of 
equity to historically disadvantaged individuals228.” 
Peterson argues that there was concern that  
“ foreign investors might invoke the protections contained in these investment treaties 
in an effort to challenge certain Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policies in 
South Africa229”  
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This was one of the situations where foreign policy objectives were at loggerheads 
with domestic policy. South Africa wanted foreign direct investment but were not 
willing to abandon BEE requirements for doing business in South Africa to get it. 
Perterson230 explains further that  
 “These treaties provide foreign investors with the capacity to detour around the 
domestic court system of their host country, and to pursue international arbitration in 
case of the alleged breach by the host state of treaty protections. The protections 
contained in these agreements include duties to pay “market value” compensation in 
case of expropriation or nationalization; and to provide “full protection and security” 
and “fair and equitable treatment” to foreign investors and investments; and to treat 
foreign investors and foreign investments no less favourably than domestic investors 
and investments.” 
 
Arbitration and legal disputes Peterson231, found evidence of a case where a foreign investor took South Africa to 
court and won resulting in SA having to pay some money to the investor, as 
compensation. 
November 2008, the joint U.S. export sales marketing arm of U.S. soda ash producers 
agreed to pay a fine and withdraw as a joint entity from the South African market as 
part of a settlement with South Africa’s Competition Commission of a longstanding 
complaint that the U.S. entity operated as a price-fixing cartel with respect to export 
sales to South Africa. The settlement stated that U.S. producers will be free to make 
export sales to South Africa. The settlement stated that U.S. producers will be free to 
make export sales to South Africa on an independent basis232. 
UN Security Council 
Decisions 
“U.S. officials articulated frustration with the South African government on positions it 
took during its term on the Security Council 2007-2008. The Mbeki Administration was 
criticized by the United States as well as by many human rights activists for its lack of 
support for human rights issues raised before the Council233. The decisions that the 
two differed on particularly were decisions on, Burma, Zimbabwe and Lebanon234.” 
“ Many supporters of the anti-apartheid struggle, and former admirers of the African 
National Congress (ANC), are confused and dismayed by some aspects of the foreign 
policy of post-apartheid South Africa. Their disappointment is summed up in the 
assessment in the 2009 Annual Report of Human Rights Watch that, during South 
Africa’s recent two-year stint on the United Nations Security Council, it consistently 
sided with and protected some of world’s worst perpetrators of human rights abuses, 
and often threats to stability, by opposing or refusing to support resolutions on behalf 
of victims of violations in Sudan, Myanmar, Uzbekistan, Belarus, North Korea and, 
especially, its neighbour Zimbabwe.235” 
South Africa took up the seat again in 2011.  
 
Zimbabwe “South Africa’s critics maintain that its record on good governance and human rights 
issues, particularly in relation to its neighbour Zimbabwe, conflicts with its 
commitments under the UN and AU charters and the requirements of the African Peer 
Review Mechanism. They also maintain that South Africa’s stance has not only been 
deeply damaging for Zimbabwe but that it does not serve the interests of South Africa 
or the SADC region. Among the reasons for an emphasis on Zimbabwe is its 
precipitous decline, over the past decade, from being one of Africa’s most stable, 
prosperous states to being one of the worst off, with a quarter of the population fleeing 
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into exile and a drastic decline in living standards and life expectancy for those 
remaining 236” 
HIV/AIDS Policy South Africa and the U.S. were at loggerheads over South Africa’s HIV/AIDS Policy 
during Thabo Mbeki’s era and this cost South Africa dearly. Ironically, this is one of the 
areas that went on to become a great area of co-operation between the two countries 
once South Africa decided to roll out ARV’s. US AID, to this day, still provides the 
majority of money used for HIV/AIDS awareness campaigns, drug roll-out 
programmes, testing campaigns as well as Tuberculosis education and treatment. 
Iran and other “Pariah States” “….states such as Iran, Iraq, Palestine, Cuba, Libya, and Zimbabwe. While South 
Africa has proudly supported these states, many of them have been considered pariah 
states by the Americans and subjected to US sanctions237” 
“South Africa moved to comply with U.S. banking and trade sanctions on Iran by 
eliminating its imports of Iranian oil in 2012, earning U.S. sanction waivers. In the past 
it has variously opposed and supported U.N. sanctions on Iran. In September 2012, it 
offered a U.S.-opposed amendment to a U.N. resolution, which called for International 
Atomic Energy Agency probes of suspected Iranian atomic bomb research. South 
Africa was also critical of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, as well as alleged U.S. 
unilateral actions toward the regime of Saddam Hussein prior to the war. More 
recently, it opposed Western military intervention in Libya, preferring an AU-brokered 
mediation that the United States and others ultimately viewed as ineffective. South 
Africa, which served on the U.N. Security Council from 2011 to 2012, has also voiced 
caution regarding proposed external interventions in Syria and called for even-handed 
treatment of the government and opposition groups238” 
Patent laws The crux of this dispute was that “Pharmaceuticals in South Africa have been priced 
above costs for the same drugs being sold in other countries in the region and in other 
parts of the world. 239” 
“The South African government has come under pressure from the Clinton 
Administration to adjust its domestic patent laws in order to continue pharmaceutical 
patent protection. The disagreement between South Africa and the United States 
revolves around changes to the 1965 Medicines and Related Substances Control Act 
(1965 Medicines Act), which allows the Health Minister to abrogate patent rights for 
pharmaceuticals, to issue compulsory licenses and to allow parallel imports of 
pharmaceuticals with the goal being to lower pharmaceutical prices. The U.S. 
government wants the offending clauses repealed, guaranteeing full protection to 
foreign pharmaceutical patents. However, the South African government maintains 
that it needs these tools in order to combat various problems in its health care system, 
including the burdens inflicted by the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) 
crisis. Because of the patent issue, the United States has removed privileges for 
South Africa under the generalized system of preferences (GsP) and could move to 
impose harsher economic sanctions later240.” 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter set out to determine the relationship between the United States 
and South Africa.  An analysis of the relationship shows an ambivalent South 
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Africa negotiating with a sure footed U.S. South Africa sought a good 
relationship with the U.S. but didn’t want to be seen to agree too often with the 
global hegemon, lest it give credence to accusations of being its puppet. Such 
accusations were abound especially in the early nineties and early 2000’s. The 
discussion above however shows that the South African government stood its 
ground and took action against the U.S. on many important issues. South Africa 
also made many gains from its relationship with the U.S. especially in capacity 
building and helping with resources for the fight against the scourge of 
HIV/AIDS which at some point threatened to destabilise the country.  
Coleman-Adebayo and other critics argue that from early in the relationship, 
South Africa bent over backward too many times and prioritised a neo-liberal 
economic approach at the expense of its domestic conditions and people when 
negotiating with the U.S. 241. The truth however, lies somewhere in the middle. 
South Africa found itself negotiating within a specific context and time and did 
its best to adapt and fit into that structure whilst attempting to make some 
changes to the global economic system from within. The well documented role 
of the South African government and in particular, former president Thabo 
Mbeki as a crusader for a change in WTO and other global economic systems 
institutions as well as debt relief for poor countries is a testament to this. Mbeki 
was open about his ambitions for South Africa to be a champion of the South. In 
one of many speeches he made to U.S. and other countries business 
delegations, he highlighted the need for the reform of the global system to the 
benefit of the developing world242.  
He offered that: 
“ We need to create a situation where developing countries are 
themselves part of the rules-making process and that the rules take 
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cognisance of the specific realities of the developing countries rather than 
approach the rules from a “one size fits all” perspective243. “ 
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CHAPTER 5. UNDERSTANDING SOUTH AFRICA IN 
THE REGION 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides the reader with a context for South Africa’s role in the 
region and how it relates to countries on the African continent, including its 
neighbours BLNS. The debate and merits of each the arguments on whether 
South Africa is a regional hegemon, pivotal state, middle power or co-operative 
hegemon is undertaken. South Africa’s role in SACU is deliberated, especially 
the effect of its dominance on BLNS, within the SACU arrangement. Finally, the 
SACU –US TIDCA is critically examined and its impact on each member of 
SACU is contested.	
5.2 South Africa: regional hegemon or middle power?  
 “South Africa has consistently outperformed its African neighbours in FDI 
attraction since FDI markets records began in 2003… attracting about one fifth 
of all investments in to the continent, more than double its closest African rival, 
Morocco.244” 
The FDI flows, serve to cement the country’s status as one of the most 
desirable partners in the continent for many countries. The country’s economic 
size also means South Africa has strong trade relationships with a number of 
countries on the African continent, with some countries even making its top 5 
export and import countries (as shown below). 
South Africa, on the other hand is the biggest Foreign Direct Investor in 
Southern Africa having invested in countries as diverse as Tanzania, DRC, 
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Zimbabwe and Mozambique245. Trade on the continent has risen by more than 
“300 %   since 1994” although trade is still in favour of South Africa with more 
exports from South Africa than imports from the continent246. 
Table 8: South Africa’s Top Five receiver of exports in Africa Source: Department of Trade and Industry (South 
Africa) Trade Data 
 
Table 9: South Africa’s Top Five importers in Africa Source: Department of Trade and Industry (South Africa) 
Trade Data 
 
Oden247  analyses South Africa’s relationship with the continent and argues that 
it has gone from “being the main regional destabiliser, which the other countries 
have to co-operate against to the main source of economic growth, with which 
they have to co-operate.”  
Oden248   argues that during apartheid, South Africa’s role as a hegemon was 
undermined by external factors and the political situation. He identifies the 
following as external factors: 
a) “Before independence - the colonial powers 
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South Africa Top Five Trade Partners ‐ Africa
South Africa Trade by Country 
Country Annual growth %
Name 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2013 2012 Total % Cum % 2012-2013
BOTSWANA 44 496 41 645 33 177 30 451 29 263 4 4 4.78 30.19 6.85
NAMIBIA 40 961 33 534 31 147 28 276 23 891 6 6 4.40 39.06 22.15
MOZAMBIQUE 27 373 19 316 17 486 13 766 13 402 10 12 2.94 51.72 41.71
ZAMBIA 26 282 21 784 17 225 12 674 11 960 11 10 2.82 54.55 20.65
ZIMBABWE 23 196 19 850 17 636 15 543 13 307 13 11 2.49 59.56 16.85
Exports to World in ( R' Million) Rank Proportions 2013
South Africa Trade by Country 
Country Imports to World in ( R' Million) Rank Proportions 2013 Annual growth %
Name 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2013 2012 Total % Cum % 2012-2013
NIGERIA 34892.274 30546.411 22654.261 16079.707 15634.452 7 7 3.503703 52.629142 14.22708169
ANGOLA 18919.874 22999.846 11514.243 14600.554 11659.012 13 9 1.8998366 67.194177 -17.73912446
MOZAMBIQUE 12212.542 10377.728 7425.596 3843.7232 3508.7886 19 19 1.2263208 76.530911 17.68031043
SWAZILAND 11251.716 9482.4728 6790.875 7219.8934 6251.7517 20 25 1.1298395 77.660751 18.65803467
NAMIBIA 6657.9217 5341.7145 5325.6589 4976.1125 3814.419 31 33 0.6685543 87.491007 24.64016328
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b) After independence and during the Cold War by the super powers and 
to a certain extent former colonial powers 
c) From the 1980s, increasingly by the Brenton Woods Institutions and 
bilateral aid donors249” 
As discussed previously, countries in the region were opposed to apartheid and 
united against South Africa in their opposition. This made it difficult for South 
Africa to exercise its power as a regional hegemony. It also made regional 
integration impossible. As a result, “economic links between South Africa and its 
neighbouring countries did not grow between 1975 – 1990.”250 
However, all this changed with the dawn of democracy. Nkuhlu, an officer of the 
Department of Trade and Industry, quoted in McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng251 
explained South Africa’s predicament best, 
“Whereas South Africa has no desire or ambitions for hegemonic designs in the 
region, it continues to have legitimate interests ... a new relationship will also 
not be sustained if it is perceived to be based on a series of demands by the 
smaller states” 
Ever since the pivotal “I am an African” 252speech and the ‘African Renaissance, 
South Africa and the world” 253speech by then Deputy President of South Africa, 
Thabo Mbeki, the country has made great strides in its efforts to lead Africa.  
Mbeki’s African Renaissance was a “doctrine for Africa’s political, economic and 
social renewal and a call for political democratisation, economic growth and the 
re-integration of Africa into the global economy254”. 
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There are many activities that South Africa has undertaken to cement its role as 
a leader on the African continent. It was the leading force behind the change 
and revival of the Organisation of African Union into the African Union in 
1999255. It was also the driving force behind the development of various 
programmes to monitor governance on the continent including the African Peer 
Review Mechanism as well as the establishment and hosting of the Pan African 
Parliament on South African soil under the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) Programme256.  South Africa also fought for changes in 
the permanent membership structure of the United Nations (UN) Security 
Council and won, taking up the seat between 2007-2008 and again in 2011257. 
Since democracy the country has also been involved in numerous efforts to 
solve conflict on the continent for countries like the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Sudan, Zimbabwe, 
Swaziland, Mali, Madagascar and many others.   
South Africa has made some gains in convincing its neighbours to support it in 
various important decisions that have gained it global respect like the fight for 
new countries to be included in the Security Council on a global scale and the 
support for the candidacy of former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nkosazana 
Dlamini Zuma as Chairperson of the African Union on a regional scale. All this 
bodes well for Flemes’s definition of a regional power as a country that  258 “can 
be distinguished by four pivotal criteria: claim to leadership, power resources, 
employment of foreign policy instruments and acceptance of leadership” 
South Africa’s role of being of a leader in African conflict resolution has been 
recognised by many. Ploth259,describes SA as a country with “a government 
that has played an active role in promoting regional peace and stability”. She 
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adds further that, “South Africa is poised to have a substantial impact on the 
economic and political future of Africa260.” She also highlights that “South Africa 
is the only African member of the G20, the premier forum for international 
economic cooperation261”, a big achievement for the country and the continent. 
South Africa’s motivation for the activities highlighted above, has always been 
clearly articulated as part of a plan or fight for “…the eradication of poverty and 
the economic empowerment of the South, translating into its economic 
liberation within the context of an increasingly globalizing world.262” 
Although the country has received many glowing reviews for all its work on the 
continent and the globe, there have also been many voices critical of South 
Africa’s actions and foreign policy strategies. Many analysts and countries on 
the continent are constantly challenging its regional power status and role and 
are even critical of what they see as South Africa’s “giantism” 263.  This is the 
fear that South Africa has and could use its military and economic power for the 
destruction of its smaller neighbours and trade partners264.  
Adebajo and Landsberg, 265  describe how former South African president 
Thabo Mbeki spearheaded the African Renaissance project with then Nigerian 
President Olusegun Obasanjo. They travelled the globe preaching the message 
of “ democracy, development and security and seeking foreign investment for 
their ailing economies 266 “They also campaigned for “greater international 
burden sharing in peace keeping missions in Africa, …the annulment of Africa’s 
external debt, ….better access for African goods entering Western markets and 
called for Africa’s integration into the global economy”267.  
In spite of all this, they argue that South Africa does not fulfil the traditional 
definition of a “hegemon” but is rather a “pivotal state”, as also described by the 
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U.S. A pivotal state is defined as “a state that has economic and military power 
as well as influence over other states in its sub-region268”. They contend that 
South Africa has the economic and military might but lacks the legitimacy 
required to be a true hegemon due to its chequered military and political past 
under apartheid.  
Adebajo and Landsberg 269 identify the problem with South Africa as the inability 
to provide clear leadership to others that allays their fears whilst providing 
leadership to them. They argue that a true hegemon needs to “make it clear to 
the hegemonised that they have the ability to reward and punish”. They point to 
South Africa’s failure, at times, to influence their neighbours on pivotal political, 
security and economic decisions as evidence of its illegitimacy. Zimbabwe, 
Namibia and Angola, are identified as the stumbling blocks to South Africa’s 
aspirations to hegemony. In conclusion, they determine that instead of being a 
beacon of democracy and development, the country could end up resulting in a 
division of unity on the continent with states grouping together in anti-hegemon 
alliances against both South Africa and Nigeria. 
Alden and Le Pere 270, disagree and argue South Africa is actually a hegemon 
even though they identify it as ‘hegemony on a shoestring’. They point to 
Pretoria’s ability to build regional institutions and “moral suasion “and the 
expansion of its businesses into the continent, which all had an impact in 
“restructuring the regional economic and political architecture” as signs of the 
country’s hegemon status. 
Jordaan 271 on the other hand, provides yet another view and argues that South 
Africa is an emerging “middle power” and distinguishes between a traditional 
and emerging middle power. He defines a middle power as a country that will 
“display foreign policy behaviour that stabilises and legitimises the global order, 
typically through multilateral and cooperative initiatives.” He identifies traditional 
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middle powers as countries like Australia, Sweden and Canada, whilst 
emerging middle powers are identified as South Africa, Argentina and Malaysia.  
He defines emerging middle powers as those that: 
“…..are semi-peripheral, materially inegalitarian and recently democratised 
states that demonstrate much regional influence and self-association. 
Behaviourally, they opt for reformist and not radical global change, exhibit 
a strong regional orientation favouring regional integration but seek also to 
construct identities distinct from those of the weak states in their 
region.”272 
On the other hand, traditional middle powers are identified as, 
“States that are neither great nor small in terms of international power, capacity 
and influence and demonstrate a propensity to promote stability and cohesion in 
the world system.” 
He argues that most attempts at understanding middle powers focus on one or 
a combination of the following attributes namely on “ state capacity, position in 
the world order, the normative composition of the middle-power state–societal 
complex, domestic class interests, and the role and influence of foreign policy-
makers273” According to Jordaan, middle powers have a good reputation as 
they are seen to have an “absence of self-interested foreign policy behaviour in 
which the gains are immediate and clear”  and this has led to “an image of 
middle powers as good international citizens”274. Jordaan 275 defines them as 
“stabilisers and legitimisers of the world order, whether in times of hegemony or 
not.” 
This analysis of middle power status and the classification of South Africa as 
such, fits     some analysts, criticism of South Africa as a country that seems to 
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be changing the status qou on the surface but is actually just keeping the neo-
liberal agenda alive. 
Flemes276 , however sees things differently and argues that South Africa is a co-
operative hegemon, as its “reformist South oriented multilateralism is 
challenging some of the guiding principles of the current international system.” 
This refutes the argument of not changing the world order, which is a pre-
requisite for being classified as a middle power. 
Alden and le Pere sum up South Africa’s relationship with the continent as 
follows: 
“South Africa’s future interface with Africa will depend on the extent to which it 
can confront its own horsemen of the apocalypse in the form of endemic 
poverty, crime and inequality, address its image deficits by changing its 
orientation in Africa to one based on genuine partnership, restrain the predatory 
and acquisitive instincts of its capital, and share its developmental successes 
with the continent in a fair and equitable manner.277” 
The debate of whether South Africa is a reluctant hegemon or a middle power 
continues amongst analysts. Hentz 278 postulates that that the reason for the 
debate in the first place is because South Africa is neither or but has elements 
of both. He argues that South Africa, 
“is pursuing a strategy for regional economic integration/cooperation that has 
elements of both ad-hoc cooperation and developmental integration/cooperation 
as a way to placate two important constituencies, labour and big business279”  
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South Africa’s actions on the continent and in SACU, which will be discussed 
below, prove Hentz 280to be correct in his analysis that South Africa uses the 
mixed approach. 
5.3 South Africa in SACU 
“A trade bloc can be defined as a ‘preferential trade agreement’ (PTA) between 
a subset of countries, designed to significantly reduce or remove trade barriers 
within member countries. When a trade bloc comprises neighbouring or 
geographically close countries, it is referred to as a ‘regional trade (or 
integration) agreement281” 
The South African Customs Union (SACU) is an example of a trade bloc that 
compromises neighbouring or geographically close countries or a regional 
integration agreement by the definition above. It is made up of South Africa, 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland.  
Abass282 defines a region “….as a notion encompassing entities, which may, 
but do not necessarily, belong to a geographically determinable area, having 
either common or disparate attributes and values, but which seek the 
accomplishment of common goals”. 
The SACU agreement between members, South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia and Swaziland, makes the whole region a Free Trade Area (FTA) with 
no internal barriers283.  SACU was founded in 1910 and the original agreement 
284 was signed between the then governments of Bechuanaland (present day 
Botswana), Swaziland, Basutoland (present day Lesotho) and the Union of 
South Africa (present day South Africa). Under SACU, “the five member states 
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maintain a common external tariff, share customs revenues, and co-ordinate 
policies and decision making on a wide range of trade issues”285.  
SACU countries share a common monetary area with all the currencies pegged 
on the South African rand, with the exception of Botswana286.  
They also have a common revenue pool which,  
“consists of all customs, excise and additional duties collected in the common 
customs area and these duties and taxes are paid into South Africa’s national 
Revenue Fund, and subsequently distributed among SACU members according 
to a revenue-sharing formula.287” 
The Customs Union has been reviewed twice since inception, with new 
agreements signed in 1969 and again in 2002. The 2002 revision was 
undertaken when members recognised that the agreement of 1969 was no 
longer relevant to the world they were living in  288 . The independence of 
Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland in the 1960s, the new membership by Namibia 
in 1990, as well as the democratisation of South Africa in 1994 all served to 
highlight the need to make changes in the rules of the union289 .  
The main changes of the 2002 Agreement focused on   
 “joint decision-making processes based on consensus and involving all 
SACU member states, and by establishing common institutions …  
 dispute resolution, the Agreement established an ad hoc Tribunal to 
resolve any differences that might occur between or amongst member 
states.  
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 A new revenue formula was introduced as well, which takes into account 
the different levels of economic development of the various member 
states, and determines how revenue derived from customs and excise 
duties is to be shared290” 
Another inclusion in the agreement was that all member states agreed that they 
needed to have “common or harmonised policies and increased cooperation, in 
the areas of industrial development, agriculture and competition policy291”. A 
crucial point also included in the 2002 changes was Article 31, the Common 
Negotiating Mechanism (CNM)292. Under the CNM, the SACU Council decided 
that all trade negotiations with third parties must be conducted with SACU as 
whole, not individual countries293. In spite of all these changes and the search 
for equality amongst members, Hichert et al 294 and Mc Carthy 295 conclude that 
the organisation is unequal and politically and administratively dominated by 
South Africa.  
One of the problems within SACU is that South Africa sets the MFN Common 
External Tariff and according the World Trade Organisation, “it appears that the 
structure of the CET does not adequately reflect the needs of the individual 
economies of the other SACU members296”. Grynberg and Motswapong297 offer 
the opinion that the 2002 agreement led to changes but did not change the 
terms of engagement.  
“The apartheid regime created a RSF that served to increase the share of 
revenue of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS), leaving the South African 
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share a residual of revenues ….. The 2002 formula increased the share to the 
BLNS and removed South Africa as a residual claimant but did not change the 
fundamental economic relationship between members298” 
One of the changes in the 2002 agreement included “higher allocations for the 
most vulnerable countries, Swaziland and Lesotho299 ”. The new revenue 
sharing model was however only implemented in 2005 and upon its 
implementation many fundamental flaws of the model were exposed300 .  
According to Flatters and Stern   
“Immediate “data problems” related to implementation of the RSF have brought 
to light some more serious issues with the design of the formula and more 
fundamentally with some of the underlying assumptions and expectations about 
short and longer term fiscal relationships between South Africa and its smaller 
and less well developed BLNS partners301.” 
The main difference between the old revenue formula and the new formula was 
that the formula “during the apartheid era had more of a political than an 
economic rationale302” Hentz303 argues that the new system attempted to be 
more equitable by basing each country’s share on its “contribution to intra – 
SACU imports” except for South Africa who although contributed” close to 80 
percent of the customs pool, it will only get 50 percent back” 
Edwards, Cassim and Seventer 304highlight the following as key difference 
brought by the new agreement: 
 “A dispute settlement mechanism 
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 The requirement to have common policies on industrial development, 
agriculture, competition, and unfair trade practices; and a new system 
regarding the common revenue pool and sharing formula” 
The higher revenue BLNS received used to provide them with foreign exchange 
and allow them to finance imports but that is not the case anymore305. The 
implementation of the new model coincided with the global economic crisis and 
the Common Revenue Pool dropped by up to 40% with a deficit recorded for 
the years 2009/10 and 2010/11.  This was attributed to “the reduction of imports 
into the region, while excise duties declined due to a slowdown in domestic 
production as result of the global financial and economic crisis 306” 
SACU officials themselves recognised the unequal nature of the revenue 
distribution and a SACU Council of Ministers meeting decided to begin another 
process of reviewing the Revenue Sharing Arrangement. South Africa is battling 
many pressures on its fiscus that make contributing about 40 billion to BLNS no 
longer sustainable307. As a result, it is pushing for a “developmental funding 
formula” which would see a percentage of the money set aside for regional and 
industrial development308.  BLNS on the other hand, are seeking more of the 
same because of the impact that a different sharing model would have on their 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)309. A further reduction in the revenue that BLNS 
countries receive would cripple these countries as their Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) depends on the SACU revenues. This is especially the case for 
Swaziland and Lesotho but even Botswana would face a financial crisis.  
The country received an average of 9.3 billion pula from the SACU pool 
between 2006 -2009 and this helped the country protect its economy from 
global instability as its economy is mainly based on income from its mining 
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industry. If the draft proposition is enacted revenues for Botswana would fall by 
about 10.3 from 17% in 2012/13 to 6.7 in 2019/20310. 
SACU is plagued by non-compliance to its agreements. The CNM principle has 
been followed by some but not by others. In the negotiations on the Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union (EU), a deal negotiated 
between SACU member states and the EU, the CNM was not followed by all. 
South Africa and Namibia refused to sign the agreement but Botswana, Lesotho 
and Swaziland signed the deal, leading to a fractured front and different trade 
relationships with the European Union amongst SACU members311. South 
Africa continues to trade with EU under the Trade Development Co-operation 
Agreement (TDCA) of 1999, which already affords the country preferential tariffs 
for 90% of its exports312. Phiri warns that “the signing of the interim EPA by 
some members of the SACU entails a violation of the SACU Agreement and 
puts in question the continued existence of SACU313.” 
Yet another change that is yet to be implemented is the harmonisation of 
institutions as per the agreement of 2002. The council sought to have 
harmonised institutions but these are still fragmented throughout SACU. There 
is still no harmonisation of institutions on “competition, agriculture, standard 
authorities; and … behind-the-border barriers314.”  BLNS countries also do not 
have their own legal and institutional framework to initiate trade remedies but 
instead follow the ones set by South Africa on all issues for example anti-
dumping tariffs315. The lack of harmonisation was even pointed out by the U.S. 
as a reason for the failure of talks towards an FTA with SACU. 
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The future of SACU is heavily dependent on South Africa and the direction it 
takes next in cementing its position in the global economy. It is important for the 
health of the organisation to implement the agreements of 2002 and later as 
they might provide a more equal plane-field for BLNS in SACU. BLNS also need 
to take some initiative and seek out more trade partnerships to expand their 
GDPs as well as the revenue they receive from SACU instead of relying on 
South Africa to lead the process316. South Africa, as the SACU member with the 
largest economy, plays a large role in the economies of BLNS states and the 
institution of SACU as demonstrated by the tables below. 
Table 10: South African exports from the World Source: Department of Trade and Industry (South Africa) Trade 
Data 
 
Table 11: South African imports from the World Source: Department of Trade and Industry (South Africa) Trade 
Data 
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South Africa and SACU trade
South Africa Trade by Country 
Country Annual growth %
Name 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2013 2012 Total % Cum % 2012-2013
BOTSWANA 44 496 41 645 33 177 30 451 29 263 4 4 4.78 30.19 6.85
NAMIBIA 40 961 33 534 31 147 28 276 23 891 6 6 4.40 39.06 22.15
SWAZILAND 14 654 15 251 11 467 12 500 12 934 15 14 1.57 63.18 -3.91
LESOTHO 13 958 13 180 11 512 9 464 8 447 17 16 1.50 66.19 5.90
Exports to World in ( R' Million) Rank Proportions 2013
South Africa Trade by Country 
Country Imports to World in ( R' Million) Rank Proportions 2013 Annual growth %
Name 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2013 2012 Total % Cum % 2012-2013
SWAZILAND 11251.716 9482.4728 6790.875 7219.8934 6251.7517 20 25 1.1298395 77.660751 18.65803467
NAMIBIA 6657.9217 5341.7145 5325.6589 4976.1125 3814.419 31 33 0.6685543 87.491007 24.64016328
BOTSWANA 5069.919 3305.2156 2450.9189 2171.234 2244.1395 38 42 0.5090952 91.689023 53.39147317
LESOTHO 2282.0007 2143.9696 1957.3216 1926.9492 1520.984 52 48 0.2291468 96.238586 6.438109707
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5.4 The SACU- US Trade, Investment, and Development 
Cooperative Agreement (TIDCA)  
The US began negotiating a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with SACU in 
2003317. Different analysts provide different reasons for the existence of the 
TIDCA, which began as a Free Trade Agreement negotiation.  
Fergusson and Sek 318suggest that SACU’s economic integration is the reason 
behind the US- SACU TIDCA. They say “a large degree of economic integration 
exists among the SACU states because of the agreement, perhaps contributing 
to the U.S. decision to negotiate an FTA with SACU, rather than just South 
Africa319.” 
Draper and Khumalo 320 and Lehloenya 321 agree and argue that in fact the 
prize for the U.S was access to South Africa that also brought SACU’s smaller 
members with it as a bonus in order to counteract the SA-EU deal. They argue 
that for the United States, the agreement was a  reaction to South Africa’s trade 
agreement with South Africa, which resulted in companies from outside the EU 
having limited access to South Africa and in turn BLNS, since they have a 
common trade tariff322. The United States’ 2004 Trade Policy Agenda and 2003 
Annual Report also shows that this is amongst the reasons for attempting to go 
into an FTA with SACU. There is a mention that “other exporters such as the 
European Union already receive preferential access to the South African 
market” which shows that the U.S. was aware of this and possibly wanted to 
counter this effect323  
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According to American official Langdon, the FTA was meant to “eliminate tariffs 
over time, reduce or eliminate non-tariff barriers, liberalize service trade, protect 
intellectual property rights, and provide technical assistance to help SACU 
nations achieve the goals of the agreement.” 324 
According to Draper and Khumalo325, the aim for SACU was to: 
“use the potential FTA as a means to achieve AGOA-plus liberalisation (by 
locking in and possibly extending current market access), address non-tariff 
barriers affecting its US-bound exports, spur regional integration in SACU and 
strengthen relations with the US as insurance against possible failure of the 
Doha round.” 
According to Langdon326, the U.S. also sought the same benefits. The FTA was 
going to be the first of such an agreement with Sub-Saharan Africa327. At the 
time of negotiation, SACU was “the largest U.S. export market in sub-Saharan 
Africa, with $2.5 billion in U.S. exports in 2002328”. Another important reason for 
the deal was that the U.S. sought to use the FTA to force SACU to harmonize 
its investment and regulatory regimes which were not uniform, in order to 
making trading with them easier329. Draper and Khumalo contend that the 
agreement of the lack of “frameworks to regulate important issues in bilateral 
economic relations, especially investment and intellectual property rights330”  
The process of negotiating was fraught with fear from the onset with many 
analysts in the region warning SACU to tread carefully as the U.S. had a 
reputation for not backing down on intellectual property issues especially. It was 
therefore no surprise when the first stalling happened in 2004 over 
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disagreement on intellectual property rights. A year later, talks began again and 
policy makers spoke of conducting negotiations issue by issue as the December 
2004 deadline came and passed. By April 2006, however, the whole process 
was suspended in favour of pursuing a trade and investment agreement331. 
When the negotiations failed, a blame-game ensued with the US blaming SACU 
and SACU blaming the US for the failure. 
“The US attributed the failure of the talks to the absence of harmonised trade 
and investment policies within SACU. SACU in turn blamed the US for being 
inflexible with its comprehensive negotiating template, which includes many 
new generation issues like investment that the US was not keen to engage 
in.”332 
Observers cited, “the capacity of SACU nations to negotiate a U.S.-style 
(comprehensive and high-standard) FTA, and disagreements between the 
parties on the scope and level of ambition of the negotiations 333.” 
In the meantime, the United States set about wooing various individual SACU 
members with the goal of creating bilateral agreements. Washington also hoped 
to create a trade and investment agreement that would eventually become a 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA). BLNS countries refused to sign on a version of 
the SACU-US agreement that was not satisfactory to them, as a result of their 
experiences with the European Union – South Africa trade agreement334. 
During February 2007335, both sides agreed to enter into a Trade, Investment 
and Cooperation Agreement (TIDCA) instead of the FTA that was initially 
sought out.  On 16 April 2008336, the U.S. and SACU finally signed a Trade and 
Investment Development Cooperation Agreement (TIDCA). According to SACU, 
the signature of the 2008 agreement was “aimed at promoting investment and 
                                            
331 U.S. –SACU bilaterals.Accessed from http://www.bilaterals.org/?-US-SACU- Accessed on 28 May 2014 
332 Draper P and Khumalo N. (October 2007). One size doesn’t fit all. Deal breaker issues in the failed US- SACU Free 
trade negotiations. pp 11 
333 Jones C and Williams B. (14 November 2012). U.S. Trade and Investment Relatinos with sub-Saharan Africa and the 
African Growth and Opportunity Act. Accessed from http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31772.pdf on 16 July 2013 
334 Lehloenya P.M.(2009). The Failed SACU-USA Free Trade Agreement in Hindsight: A Lost Opportunity or Disaster 
Averted? Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology, Vol. 4, Issue 2. 
335 Agreement between SACU and US. Accessed from http://www.sacu.int/traden.php?id=414 Accessed on 28 May 
2014 
336 Ibid  
 
91
expanding and diversifying trade between SACU and the USA.337 “ The 
highlight of the agreement was the establishment of a consultative group on 
trade and investment but little else was conceded outside of the benefits South 
Africa was already receiving from the U.S. 338.   
An analysis of the SACU – US agreement shows that the U.S. wanted the 
agreement to effectively compete with the European Union who had a trade 
deal with South Africa. The U.S. –S.A. agreement did have some gains but was 
not powerful enough to give access to the whole region. To solve this, the U.S. 
pushed for a SACU deal, particularly an FTA. It stands to reason then that the 
U.S. – S.A. TIDCA did not have a negative impact on BLNS. In fact, it seems 
the lessons learnt by BLNS in the EU – SA negotiations made them better 
negotiators. They made the point clear that only way to gain access to their 
markets is not through signing an agreement with S.A. as the EU did, but rather 
to sign a SACU deal. One key criticism of the SACU –US TIDCA is that it ‘does 
not go any further than merely political statements’ and does not provide any 
more benefits than what SACU member South Africa,  gets via AGOA and 
GATTS 339   
This chapter sought to offer the reader a context for South Africa’s role in the 
region and how it relates to countries on the African continent, including its 
neighbours BLNS. The debate around South Africa’s position and whether it is a 
hegemon, pivotal state, middle power or co-operative hegemon is undertaken.  
5.5 Summary 
This study has shown that South Africa seems to have taken a co-operative 
hegemon stance as it co-operates with its trade partners, sometimes even to its 
own detriment, but other times it makes decisions and simply carries BLNS 
along with or without its consent. South Africa’s role in SACU was also analysed 
with a focus on the effect of its dominance on BLNS, within the SACU. Finally, 
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the SACU –US TIDCA was analysed and found to be an empty document that 
offer very little to BLNS outside of the benefits SA already receives.  
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study sought to interrogate ‘The impact of the United States (U.S.) and 
South Africa’s (S.A) trade relationship on Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and 
Swaziland (BLNS) [1999-2013]’. In doing so, the analysis was focused on 
discovering if there was an impact –whether negative or positive, on BLNS 
caused by the trade relationship between U.S. and S.A. It focused specifically in 
the period between 1999 and 2013 but there was some analysis of events 
before 1999 in order to provide a historical context for the analysis.  
The introductory chapter of this study set out to introduce the reader to South 
Africa and its relationship with the United States and its neighbours Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS). In analysing the relationship between 
the U.S. and South Africa, it was shown that the two countries have a long trade 
relationship that even pre-dates democracy. The close relationship between the 
U.S and South Africa during apartheid was to have an impact on its relationship 
with democratic S.A. The relations between the two countries during apartheid 
explain why South Africa never completely trusted the U.S.’s intentions as there 
were many within the country that saw the U.S. as an ally of the apartheid 
government. This didn’t mean that there wasn’t a relationship between the new 
government and the U.S. nor that the relationship was antagonistic. It simply 
meant that when entering negotiations with the U.S. there was always a level of 
distrust, which was also exaggerated by the history of U.S. dealings 
internationally and its history of sometimes over-stepping other countries 
sovereign rights. This combined history meant that although South Africa trades 
and relates with the U.S. successfully, all negotiations were conducted with a 
certain level of ambivalence. Another complicating factor in the relationship is 
the difference in ideologies between the two countries and the remnants of Cold 
War politics. During the Cold War, the then banned African National Congress 
which is the ruling party in South Africa belonged to organisations that were 
allies of the Soviet Union and its partners. In fact, ANC, PAC and many other 
organisations banned during apartheid were supported by the Soviet Union and 
its allies. They provided financial support and military training to these 
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organisations.  Many ANC leaders spent long periods in Russia and other 
Soviet Union ally countries during the fight against apartheid. These 
relationships continued once South Africa became a democratic country led by 
the ANC. This immediately pitted the incoming government against the U.S. in a 
number of ways. It meant that at times there were ideological disputes between 
the two which are discussed in some detail in the second chapter. Beyond 
ideological differences South Africa had many disagreements with the U.S. over 
its relationships with sworn U.S. enemies like Cuba, Libya, Iran and many 
others.  
As part of the study, South Africa’s foreign policy making was also discussed. It 
was found that at the dawn of democracy, South Africa considered three 
different approaches and the most neo-liberal of the three won the order of the 
day. This was chosen, as South Africa sought international standing and a 
foreign policy that was visibly different from the apartheid government’s policy. 
The chosen policies also meet the stringent criteria of Brenton Woods 
institutions, which were critical for entering the global economy in the nineties. It 
quickly liberalised markets, privatised a number of state entities and developed 
stringent tax laws in order to achieve this. This approach caused many internal 
disagreements between the ANC and its alliance partners. It has also resulted 
in the ruling party being accused of selling out the socialist cause in favour of 
capitalism. The choice of foreign policy by South Africa had an impact on the 
policy direction of the country, especially economic policy.  The controversial 
and much criticised GEAR and ASGISA programmes were created based on 
the expected gains from the foreign policy outlined. There is still rigorous debate 
within the country over the true cost of this policy line and its impact on the 
economy, the high unemployment rate and the resultant socio-economic 
problems.  This is a possible area of research, an analysis of the impact of 
South Africa’s foreign policy on South Africa’s ability to provide employment for 
its citizens.  
The study of regional integration and its impact on participating countries is not 
new. The study of the impact of multiple agreements by individual members on 
the rest of the regional integration grouping is also not new. In fact the past 50 
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years have seen an increase in regional integration schemes and with it, an 
increase in research around them. What is new about this study is its focus 
specifically on the impact of global hegemon U.S. and regional hegemon, S.A. 
on BLNS countries. There have been studies on the impact of S.A.’s 
relationship with the E.U. on BLNS but none that interrogates the impact of the 
U.S.-S.A. relationship on BLNS. 
This study is a qualitative study and mainly utilises documentary evidence to 
come to a conclusion. A content analysis of existing literature was undertaken in 
order to conduct research that seeks to find out the impact of the U.S. and S.A. 
trade relationship on BLNS counties. In conducting the literature review it was 
found that although SACU is a 100 year organisation there is still very little 
research conducted into the actions and implications of BLNS countries. This is 
a possible area of future research. Of the research that does exist, a large 
portion of it is focused on South Africa’s dominant role and this means that 
there is little research that actively seeks to understand BLNS countries. There 
is also a shortage of research that analyses the various trade agreements that 
South Africa enters into with other countries. Where this data exists, it has been 
provided by either the SAIIA or TRALAC. This means that there is a lack of 
diversity in opinion in this space. This also provides possible areas of future 
research. 
BLNS countries are small developing countries, flanked by a regional hegemon 
and this means that researchers who study SACU seem to focus on S.A. at the 
expense of research on BLNS. This meant that trying to find any data on the 
actions of BLNS and how it was impacted by any agreements was a difficult 
feat. There is a general dearth of research on these countries and when it 
exists, there is a dearth of trade data and or analysis to back up that date. This 
is another possible area of research. Studies could be done that will develop 
data for BLNS countries that is independent of SACU revenues and also 
separates and identifies the different sources of the SACU revenue itself. 
The lack of data made it hard to conduct a thorough statistical analysis of the 
impact and explains why this study ended up focused on interrogating many 
documents, to come to a conclusion that there was little impact on BLNS from 
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the trade relationship between the U.S. and South Africa. BLNS countries seem 
to have learnt from the experience of South Africa’s trade deal with the 
European Union which led to so many losses for them that S.A and the E.U. 
had to provide financial compensation in the form of aid for BLNS to accept the 
deal. This experience seems to have impacted BLNS countries so much that 
when the U.S. and South Africa began negotiations towards any agreement, 
BLNS countries were quick to remind S.A. of the EU experience. This also 
became visible during negotiations with the U.S. towards a SACU FTA which 
later became a SACU TIFA, in part because BLNS was only willing to go so far 
in terms of opening their markets to the U.S. 
A number of agreements were explored as part of the study, namely: 
 The African Growth and Opportunities Act of 2000 (AGOA) 
 The S.A. – U.S. Trade Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) 
 SACU agreements between members of 1910, 1969 and 2002 
 The failed SACU –US Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that became the 
SACU – U.S. Trade, Investment, and Development Cooperation 
Agreement (TIDCA) 
On the African Growth and Opportunities Act of 2000 (AGOA), it was found that 
South Africa is one of the biggest benefactors of these trade scheme. It was 
also found that the country has the most diverse number of exports compared 
to its other sub-Saharan counterparts. South Africa benefits from this scheme 
so much that various American lobby groups have argued that it should be 
‘graduated’ out of the programme. The scheme is meant to help small African 
countries who otherwise would not be able to access the American market, and 
these groups argue that South Africa, no longer fits that description.  
These increasing calls for the removal of S.A. from AGOA and the fact that the 
scheme is unilateral and can be withdrawn at any time, poses a threat to South 
Africa’s relationship with the U.S. If the country was to be removed from the 
scheme, the effects would be devastating for South Africa but not necessarily 
have much of an impact on the U.S. as the total trade from AGOA amounts to 
only two percent of its international trade. South Africa has and continues to 
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seek a bilateral trade agreement with the United States that is binding and not 
easy to get out of like AGOA. Efforts to secure this have been thwarted by a 
number of issues discussed in the study including BLNS and its need for 
assurances that the negative experience of the EU deal will not be repeated.  
Yet, another possible area of future research exists in finding out what would 
happen to the South Africa economy if the country was removed from AGOA 
and GPS schemes. 
 
Another agreement that is critically analysed is the S.A. – U.S. Trade 
Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). It was found that the TIFA did not 
amount to much. It ensured that diplomats from the U.S. and S.A. met regularly 
to discuss issues of mutual co-operation. South Africa also gained assistance in 
various forms from it but there were no real trade concessions as a result of the 
agreement. It was a general cooperation agreement and not a trade agreement 
as it did not contain any market access and or tariff concessions. As already 
mentioned, there is a need for more research that analyses South Africa’s 
bilateral agreements with different countries outside of the current sources of 
such research SAIIA and TRALAC. 
South Africa is a regional hegemon and as such plays an important role on the 
continent. This role was critically analysed and the debate over whether South 
Africa is a “hegemon”, “pivotal state”, “middle power” or co-operative hegemon 
was discussed. It was concluded that South Africa is a co-operative hegemon 
as it display and uses its hegemonic status sometimes but also co-operates 
with its smaller trade partners for the benefit of the whole sometimes. South 
Africa’s foreign policy in Africa has developed to make it a known champion of 
conflict resolution and democratisation. On a global scale, the country is a 
known champion of the South, and this was achieved by fighting for and calling 
for debt relief for poor countries of the South and participating in the 
development of organisations that seek to unite the south. To this end,it is 
currently a member of India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA), Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa (BRICS) and many others. South Africa also remains 
the only country in Africa that is a member of the G20. Yet another area of 
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future research, is studies that interrogate how effective South Africa is as a 
global champion of the South as well as the effect this has on its economy i.e. 
are there instances where the country takes a decision that is good for solidarity 
with the South but not necessarily good for South Africa as an individual 
country.   
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